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1. Introduction 
 
 
Overall Policy Context 
The European Consensus on Development1, which is the cornerstone of EU development 
policy, defines as its primary objective "the eradication of poverty in the context of 
sustainable development, including pursuit of the MDGs". This objective was thereafter 
legally enshrined in Article 21 of the Treaty of European Union. The EU is fully committed to 
international goals and objectives, notably the internationally-agreed Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) and the principles on aid effectiveness (Paris Declaration, Accra 
Agenda for Action). 
 
The European Consensus has been reflected in various instruments and geographic 
strategies.2. A set of specific legal instruments provide the means for implementing EU 
development policy. Comprehensive relations with African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) 
countries are governed by the Cotonou Agreement3, with the European Development Fund 
(EDF) providing the resources to implement development policy. In other regions,  EU 
development policy is implemented via: the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) 
which covers country programmes with developing countries grouping Asia, Latin America, 
the Middle East, Central Asia and South Africa and thematic programmes with all developing 
countries, including the ACP group; the European Neighbourhood Partnership Instrument 
(ENPI) which covers countries on the southern and eastern borders of the EU (principally in 
North Africa and Eastern Europe); and the Instrument for Pre-Accession (IPA), which 
provides support to Candidate Countries for EU membership. The framework is completed by 
thematic instruments, such as the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights, the 
Instrument for Stability and the Nuclear Safety Cooperation Instrument. 
 
Development is a shared competency. The EU acts as a donor (the "28th donor") alongside the 
Member States, implementing 20% of collective EU aid, but also has a role as a coordinator, 
convener and policy-maker to foster better integrated European policies in the development 
field. The Member States have "parallel" powers with the EU (Article 4 TEU) and have their 
own aid programmes and policies, but should ensure that these complement and reinforce 
those of other Member States and the EU (Article 208 TFEU). The EU is mandated to take 
initiatives to promote such coordination (Article 210 TFEU). 
 
                                                 
1 The European Consensus on Development (2005) is a policy statement jointly adopted by the Council, EU 
Member States, the Commission and the European Parliament.  It reflects the EU willingness to make a decisive 
contribution to the eradication of poverty in the context of sustainable development, including pursuit of the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) - 
http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/european_consensus_2005_en.pdf  
2 See e.g. Joint Africa-EU Strategy 
(http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/er/97496.pdf;  
http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/files/europa_only/memo_africa_eu_relations.pdf.); EU-Latin America 
strategy  (Communication on “The European Union and Latin America: Global Players in Partnership”, 30 
September 2009); EU-Pacific strategy (Communication COM(2006) 248, 29 may.2006).  To these must be 
added the European Neighbourhood Policy (http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/strategy/strategy_paper_en.pdf)  
as well as the EU pre-accession strategy. 
3"Partnership Agreement between the members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States of the one 
part and the European Community and its Member States of the other part", signed in Cotonou, Bénin, on 23 
June 2000. http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/acp/overview/cotonou-agreement/index_en.htm.  
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In the international platform, the EU has been instrumental in the achievement of ambitious 
global agreements (e.g. Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in 2005). Common EU 
positions have also been adopted ahead of the relevant High Level meetings within the UN 
(e.g. High-Level Plenary Meeting on the MDGs in 2010 and LDC IV Conference in 2011) in 
order to contribute to both the quality and quantity of aid. The EU and several of its Member 
States are members of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) and of the G20, 
including its development working group.     
 
Over the last ten years, the EU and its Member States have maintained strong commitments to 
increase volumes of aid and improve aid effectiveness4. However, the implementation of such 
commitments has proved more problematic than anticipated5.  
 
The EU has been the leader in formulating the concept of Policy Coherence for Development 
(PCD)6 aimed at strengthening synergies between non-aid policies and development 
objectives. First reflected in the Council Conclusions of May 20057 and the European 
Consensus, this commitment to PCD has thereafter been codified in the Treaty of Lisbon.8 
The EU has elaborated a PCD work programme for the period 2010-2013, identifying the 
priority issues and outlining how the EU, through all its instruments and processes, can 
contribute to development objectives. 
 
Current challenges and the need for change 
There is wide consensus among development partners that accelerated action is needed if all 
the MDGs are to be achieved in less than five years' time9. The EU and its Member States 
have already made a strong contribution, but there is potential for even greater impact. 
 
In looking at the impact of EU development policy, one must consider the multidimensional 
nature of policy implementation – policy is implemented not just through aid projects and 
programmes at country level, but also, for example, via PCD efforts, political dialogue, 
influence in international institutions, etc..  
 
In its Practical Guide for evaluating EU activities10, the Commission distinguishes several 
levels in the so-called "chain of results": the output (a product under direct control of the 
manager – e.g. a road); the result/outcome (immediate or initial effect of an intervention – e.g. 
travel time and cost are reduced by the existence of the road); and the impact (longer-term 
effect of an intervention – e.g. access to markets). 
 
                                                 
4 More information on http://ec.europa.eu/development/how/aid_effectiveness_en.cfm 
5 Most recent data shows that over the period 2004-2009, the EU and its Member States accounted for 58% of 
net ODA to developing countries from all DAC donors, and for 65% of the global EUR 21.4 billion increase in 
ODA during this period. In 2010, the EU and its Member States missed their collective 2010 target of 0.56% by 
a wide margin (by almost EUR15 billion , but the positive trend continued and the EU and its Member States 
together reached the highest ODA/GNI ratio of the last twenty years, i.e. 0.43% ). EU Accountability Report 
2011 on Financing for Development - Review of progress of the EU and its Member States.   
6 http://ec.europa.eu/development/policies/policy_coherence_en.cfm 
7 May 2005 Council Conclusions on PCD. 
8 The latter states that "the Union shall ensure consistency between the different areas of its external action and 
between these and its other policies" (Article 21 of Treaty of the European Union), and that the "Union shall take 
account of the objectives of development cooperation in the policies that it implements which are likely to affect 
developing countries" (Article 208 of the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union). 
9 See Global Monitoring Report 2011.Improving the Odds of achieving the MDGs. The World Bank, 2011.  
10 See "Evaluating EU activities – A practical guide for the Commission services", DG BUDGET, Evaluation 
unit, July 2004 
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The higher up we go in the chain of results (impact level), the more complex is the 
attribution/contribution linkage between a given EU intervention and the impact. 
 
At output and outcome level, the attribution link with an EU intervention can relatively easily 
be made. However, at impact level, numerous other interacting factors (other actors, other 
policies or changes in the context) must be taken into account, not least the leadership role of 
the partner country in defining their own reforms and policies and raising their own revenues 
for development, for example through taxation.  An EU intervention can, at best, contribute to 
impact. 
 
When talking about the impact of EU development policy, we must therefore pay attention 
not only to the impact of EU aid programmes and projects, but also to the other aspects of EU 
development policy (such as policy and political dialogue, the international influencing 
agenda, norms setting, policy coherence for development). 
 
Furthermore, it must be noted that although the EU is an important development player and 
the world's largest aid donor, it remains nonetheless only one actor among a multitude of 
others, and provides only a part of the overall financial flows for development.  
 
Development assistance will continue to require long-term financial commitment. 
Demonstrating this increased impact will have the additional benefit of helping to maintain 
political and public support for development. In many donor countries, both within the EU 
and internationally, the legitimacy of aid is increasingly open to challenge, as the general 
public and politicians question the value of development expenditure at a time of austerity 
measures at home; visibility, transparency, accountability, value for money and results have 
become as central to the arguments for Official Development Assistance (ODA) as moral 
obligations were in less austere times. EU development aid not only has to be spent wisely in 
order to ensure best value for money, but the EU and its Member States need to demonstrate 
the impact it has had. 
 
Moreover, additional new challenges are complicating an already difficult situation. The 
succession of recent crises (financial and economic crises, food price rises, fuel price 
volatility) has deeply affected developing countries. Added to this are issues of climate 
change and energy, security and fragility, instability and poor resilience to shocks, and food 
insecurity. There has been a growing recognition that, in an interconnected world, the EU will 
not achieve its own aims on issues like security, job creation, migration and climate change in 
isolation11. Together, these additional challenges have created a new backdrop for 
development policy.  
 
In this context, the question then becomes how to ensure that the development policy of the 
EU and its Member States has the greatest possible impact on development outcomes – i.e. 
how to maximise our contribution to the achievement of the MDGs by 2015, and to the 
eradication of poverty after 2015. 
 
With a view to exploring the ways and means to further increase the impact of our 
development policy, the Commission published a Green paper on "EU development policy 
in support of inclusive growth and sustainable development - Increasing the impact of 
EU development policy" in November 2010. The aim was to launch a public debate on how 
                                                 
11 "Europe 2020 – A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth", COM(2010) 2020 final.  
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the EU could best support developing countries in mobilising their economic, natural and 
human resources in support of poverty reduction strategies.  
 
In parallel, two other public consultations have also been held: on the Green Paper on "The 
future of EU budget support to third countries"12 and on "What funding for EU external action 
after 2013?"13. 
 
Having analysed the results of these consultations, the Commission is planning to present a 
Communication on EU development policy in the third quarter of 2011. This Communication 
will be accompanied by a Communication on Budget Support and will follow the 
Commission proposals for financing external action post- 2013 (June 2011). The latter set out 
broad budgetary orientations for the post-2013 period together with proposals for the new 
Multiannual Financial Framework. Key policy options currently discussed on these 
Communications have informed the present assessment. Proposals for legal instruments to 
govern external expenditure will issue later in 2011 and have been subject to their own Impact 
Assessment processes. 
 
The Communication on EU development policy must also be seen in conjunction with two 
other major Commission policy initiatives: 
 
- First, the preparation of a common EU position for the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid 
Effectiveness (Busan, November 2011), which will look at how to take forward the core aid 
effectiveness principles and commitments. A Commission Communication14 will help to 
define a common EU position for Busan. 
- Second, the preparation of a consistent EU position for the United Nations Conference on 
Sustainable Development (Rio de Janeiro, June 2012)15 aiming at an ambitious outcome with 
concrete policies and actions for greening the economy. 
 
Considering the global nature of the policy content of this Communication, the policy 
options can only be considered in the broadest terms. While development policy is only 
partly about aid, other modalities of development cooperation (such as loans or technical 
cooperation) and policies (such as trade or fisheries policies) have an equally important part to 
play in the overall policy for promoting global development. This Impact Assessment focuses 
on Commission-managed aid as the main measurable indicator. Strengthened PCD, improved 
EU coordination, choice of aid modalities and the overall levels of finance available for 
development are all factors which will also have an impact on the EU's success at meeting its 
development objectives, but these will be constants relevant to each of the options analysed 
and therefore these elements are not considered as part of the assessment of impact. 
 
Description of EU aid 
The EU collectively is the world's largest aid donor16 and is willing to play its full part on the 
global effort to reduce poverty. In addition, the EU is (and will remain) an important global 
player, notably through its participation in world trade and through its leadership in the area 
of global climate change action. 
                                                 
12 http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/green_paper_budget_support_third_countries_en.pdf  
13 http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/green_paper_budget_support_third_countries_en.pdf  
14 Title to be confirmed; expected to issue in September 2011 
15 "Rio+20: Towards the green economy and better governance", COM(2011) 363 final. 
16 EU Accountability Report 2011 on financing for Development - Review of progress of the EU and its Member 
States.  
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Table 1 – ODA/GI and ODA per capita of EU Member States and on-EU DAC Members  
(at 2008 prices) 
ODA volumes 
(EUR billion) 
ODA per 
capita (EUR) 
ODA/GI 
(%) Country 
2004 2010 2004 2010 2004 2010 
EU 25/27 36.8 53.5 75 107 0.34 0.43 
EU 15 36.4 52.6 95 134 0.35 0.46 
EU 10/12 0.3 0.8 3 8 0.07 0.09 
USA 15.3 20.4 52 66 0.17 0.21 
Japan 6.2 6.6 49 52 0.19 0.20 
Canada 2.5 3.4 77 99 0.27 0.33 
DAC Non EU Members 29.6 38.6 58 69 0.19 0.23 
DAC Members 66.0 91.2 71 96 0.25 0.32 
Source: OECD DAC  
 
The current Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) foresees Euro 108 billion for external 
assistance for the period 2007-2013.  The various financial instruments have been shaped 
around 2 main concepts: "policy-driven" geographical instruments supporting directly EU 
external policies and "thematic instruments" addressing crises/security and cross-cutting 
issues.  
 
Instruments17 such as the European Neighbouring Partnership Instrument (ENPI - Euro 11.2 
billion), the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI - Euro 16.9 billion) and the European 
Development Fund (EDF - Euro 22.7 billion) offer a specific geographical coverage, while 
the thematic component of DCI (Euro 6.8 billion), the European Instrument for Human Rights 
and Democracy (EIDHR – Euro 1.1 billion) and the Instrument for Stability (IFS – Euro 2.1 
billion) have global coverage.  
 
The full scope of EU collective financing for development can be found in the 2011 EU 
Accountability Report on Financing for Development.  
 
The European Commission has reported EUR 14.95 billion as ODA net disbursements for 
2010. The amount includes EUR 5.15 billion of concessional EIB loans of which 4.8 billion 
were financed through own resources; the recognition of this type of loans as ODA is 
currently being discussed with the OECD. Until this is solved, the EU institutions' recognised 
ODA is EUR 9.8 billion. 
 
Beyond being an important donor, the Commission also plays the important role of aspiring to 
bring together the EU and its Member States to form a single collective EU presence in the 
global scene, capable of playing the political role that the provider of more than 50% of global 
ODA should have. 
 
Commission-managed aid is delivered through both geographical (country, regional) and 
thematic programmes.  
 
1) Sectoral distribution of EU aid 
The Commission's focus is primarily on support for social infrastructure, in areas like 
education and health, water, government and civil society. 
                                                 
17 ICI (Instruments for Industrialised Countries) and the IPA (Pre-accession) are not considered. .  
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Clockwise: social infrastructures; economic infrastructures; production; multisector/crosscutting; budget support, 
food aid; humanitarian aid; other/unallocated. 
Source: "EU contribution to the Millennium Development Goals, Some key results from European Commission 
programmes", 2010. 
 
 
2) Geographic distribution of EU aid 
Currently EU aid (i.e. aid administered directly by the Commission) is provided to about 145 
countries18. But low-income countries, including the least developed, remain the biggest 
beneficiaries. Geographically, the bulk goes to Africa and to Europe's neighbours. 
 
                                                 
18 As a matter of comparison, the World Bank –IDAs has 79 eligible countries.  
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Clockwise: Europe; Africa (North of Sahara); Africa (South of Sahara); Asia (Middle East); Asia (South & 
Central, far East); America; Oceania; Bilateral unallocated; Multilateral aid. 
Source: "EU contribution to the Millennium Development Goals, Some key results from European Commission 
programmes", 2010. 
 
1.1 Timing 
All relevant Commission services were invited to participate in the Impact Assessment 
Steering Group (IASG), with meetings scheduled as follows:  
 
2 March 2011 – introduction and initial discussions  
25 March 2011 – intermediate discussion of draft IA report 
8 April 2011 – final meeting before submission to IA board  
 
The draft Impact assessment was then submitted to the Impact Assessment Board (IAB) on 15 
April 2011, in view of the IAB meeting on 18 May. The first opinion issued by the IAB made 
several recommendations in view of improving the report, insisting notably on the need to 
further explain the problem definition and objectives of the initiative, as well as to describe 
better the various policy options and foreseen impact for each of them. 
 
A revised draft was submitted to the IAB on 20 June taking into account these suggestions 
and aiming in particular at providing deeper explanation on the problem, objectives and 
envisaged options. 
 
  9 
Following the second opinion of the IAB on 12 July, a revised draft was resubmitted with a 
view to providing further analysis of the problem and the policy context, a better explanation 
of the options and their impact as well as more information on different stakeholder's views. 
 
 
1.2 Consultation  
 
The public consultation requirements have been covered by a series of extensive debates that 
have taken place in the framework of the recently launched public consultations, respectively 
on the Green Paper on "EU development policy in support of inclusive growth and sustainable 
development – Increasing the impact of EU development policy"19, the Green Paper on "The 
future of EU budget support to third countries"20 and the public consultation on "What 
funding for EU external action after 2013?"21. 
 
EU Member States were consulted, both in writing and in various meetings and discussions at 
different levels (presentation at CODEV on 11 November 2010; EU DGs meeting 19 
November; Foreign Affairs Council 9 December; MS Experts meeting 9-10 February 2011; 
Informal Development Ministers meeting 22 February 2011). 
 
The European Parliament was also included in the consultation, through the presentation of 
the Green paper in the DEVE Committee (9 November 2010). 
 
In addition, the Green Paper was presented and discussed with different categories of 
stakeholders at a series of events, including a High Level Panel on “New Policy Challenges” 
during the European Development Days (6 December 2010), a discussion and exchange of 
views with the Committee of the Regions (14 December 2010), a seminar with non-state 
actors and the European Economic and Social Committee (11 January 2011). 
 
Partner countries were consulted on the issues raised in the Green paper, both directly and via 
EU delegations22. 
 
The results of the public consultation on the Green Paper on "EU Development Policy in 
support of inclusive growth and sustainable development – Increasing the impact of EU 
development policy" have been published23 (see executive summary in annex). Overall, most 
commentators noted the considerable strengths of the EU's development policy and practice to 
date, while also identifying scope for improvements. The need for increased sectoral and 
geographic focus was promoted by a large number of commentators.  
 
In addition to the public consultation on the Green Paper, relevant external reviews and 
literature on the Commission's performance have also been consulted in the preparation of 
this Impact Assessment. Notably, the UK carried out an extensive Multilateral Aid Review24 
in 2010, which assessed the performance of the EU alongside other international organisations 
(UN agencies, World Bank, GAVI, etc.).  The UK gave a favourable assessment of both the 
                                                 
19 http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/public-consultations/5241_en.htm  
20 http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/green_paper_budget_support_third_countries_en.pdf  
21 http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/EU_external_action_2013_background_paper.pdf  
22 30 EU delegations in partner countries have provided comments to the Green paper consultation 
23 Link to the full report of the public consultation on the Green Paper: http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/public-
consultations/5241_en.htm  
24 http://www.dfid.gov.uk/About-DFID/Who-we-work-with/Multilateral-agencies/Multilateral-Aid-Review/ 
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EDF and the EU budget instruments (DCI, ENPI, IPA, EIDHR, Stability Instrument); the 
EDF scored slightly higher than the budget instruments due to its stronger poverty focus – the 
budget instruments cover a broader range of countries, including large numbers of Middle 
Income Countries in particular in Latin America and the Neighbourhood, as well as the pre-
accession countries, and have wider-ranging objectives than poverty elimination. From the 
perspective of the UK taxpayer, it was concluded that the EDF provides "very good value for 
money" and the budget instruments "adequate value for money." It was recommended that the 
geographic focus of some budget instruments (notably the DCI) be tightened to better support 
poverty reduction, and that management for results be strengthened in both instruments.  
 
Views from important stakeholder NGOs also support the position that the Commission's 
development programme to date has been strong and effective, although there is always scope 
to increase impact and results. For example, BOND has stated that ‘from the recipient’s point 
of view, aid given through the Commission is generally considered to be more effective and 
efficient than that given bilaterally from a number of different Member States,’ especially as it 
helps to reduce administrative burdens25. Likewise, Oxfam has emphasised that Commission 
aid is ‘some of the best multilateral aid in the world’ and that ‘the EU’s global presence, 
promotion of policy coherence for development, specific competence and expertise, right of 
initiative at community level, facilitation of coordination and harmonisation, and 
supranational character’ make it a unique actor26. 
 
The OECD-DAC are in the process of carrying out a Peer Review27 of EU development 
policies and programmes. Unfortunately, however, the results of this Review will not be 
known before mid-2012.  
 
 
2. Problem definition 
 
 
EU development policy is at crossroads. Against the backdrop of key international challenges 
(financial crisis, climate change, energy access, food insecurity, migration pressures, state 
fragility, regional conflicts and international security, emergence of new 
powers/investors/donors), the legitimacy of aid discussion (enhanced by fiscal austerity and 
competition for scarce resources at home) and the new contextual settings both at EU (post-
Lisbon external action framework) and international level (G20, IFIs, UN), there is a need for 
change to “increase the impact of EU development policy.” The aim is to make the EU's 
development policy fit to meet the challenges of the coming decade, and to help partner 
countries bring about the changes needs to accelerate their own progress towards poverty 
reduction and the MDGs. 
 
The Commission will play its part in this endeavour by striving to increase the impact of the 
aid that it manages (i.e. for the period to 2013, aid allocated under Heading 4 of the EU 
Budget and from the 10th EDF; beyond 2013, aid allocated under the Multi-Annual Financial 
Framework).  
                                                 
25 BOND European Group submission to DFID's Multilateral Aid Review (see footnote above). 
26 Oxfam submission to DFID's Multilateral Aid Review (see footnote above).  
27 Peer Reviews are carried out on a rotating basis on all 24 DAC members. Peer Reviews provide in-depth 
examinations of development systems and policies, including lessons learned. The Commission was last 
reviewed in 2007. http://www.oecd.org/document/41/0,3746,en_2649_34603_46582825_1_1_1_1,00.html 
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2.1. Context of the problem 
 
The recent dynamic of global crises (volatility of energy and food prices, financial and 
economic crisis) has strongly affected developing countries and among them the poorest ones.   
 
While in the past decade economic growth has been robust in many parts of the world, a great 
deal still remains to be done and many developing countries risk lagging behind in recovering 
from the negative impacts of the global economic and financial crisis. In many of the LDCs, 
resilience in the face of the current economic crisis has been fragile, with GDP in these 
countries generally declining in 2009.  
 
There is wide consensus among development partners that accelerated action is needed if all 
the MDGs are to be achieved by 201528. The number of poor people remains high and is 
estimated by the World Bank at around 2 billion29. Some 48 countries, of about 880 million 
people, of whom 75 per cent are classified as poor, still belong to the UN category of LDCs. 
Moreover, there has been very little progress in the MDGs related to maternal and child 
mortality and quality of education, and prospects for access to sanitation are worrying30. 
Furthermore progress has varied greatly between regions and in some cases the benefits of 
growth have not been felt by the wider population even in countries where economic growth 
is robust.   
 
The UN MDG report 2011 recently published acknowledges that significant progress has 
been made towards some MDGs, due notably to continued economic growth in some 
developing countries, targeted interventions in critical areas and increased funding from many 
sources, but alerts that in several areas there is still long way to go, and achievement of MDGs 
is at risk. Concerns are particularly on the empowerment of women and girls, the promotion 
of sustainable development and the protection of the most vulnerable. 
 
The EU and its Member States have already made a strong contribution to the achievement of 
the MDGs.31 For example, close to 80% of projects in Africa deliver 'significant impact'.32 
There is, however, always scope to increase performance and impact. Furthermore, 
demonstrating this increased impact will have the additional benefit of helping to maintain 
political and public support for development. 
 
The changing global context offers new opportunities for more effective and impactful 
development efforts. New development actors have emerged on the global scene.  
 
                                                 
28 See Global Monitoring Report 2011.Improving the Odds of achieving the MDGs. The World Bank 2011.  
29 Data on poverty are taken from World Bank. Social Indicators 2010. Two poverty lines are considered  
defined as average level  
30 "Progress made on the Millennium Development Goals and key challenges for the road ahead", Commission 
Staff Working Document, SEC(2010) 418 final; "The Millennium Development Goals Report 2010", United 
Nations, 2010. 
31 See notably "EU contribution to the Millennium Development Goals – Some key results from European 
Commission programmes", 2010, 
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/infopoint/publications/europeaid/documents/188a_mdg_en.pdf  
32 EuropeAid Annual Report 2010, page 205 
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BRICS estimated development assistance 2008
33
,  
 
Traditional donors still clearly dominate the global share of ODA flows. Among them the EU 
and its Member States account for nearly 60% of net ODA from all OECD DAC donors. The 
Commission manages some 20% of the EU total.  
 
However the share of emerging partners is growing fast. According to the OECD34, all 
emerging partners together represented 5.6% of all ODA-equivalent flows to Africa in 2000-
2004, while this share has nearly doubled to 10.2% during the 2005-2010 period. Countries 
like China, India and Brazil are increasingly active in development cooperation. 
                                                 
33 Source: "Beyond the DAC: The welcome role of other providers of Development Cooperation", OECD / DCD 
Issues Brief, May 2010, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/58/24/45361474.pdf  
34 OECD, African Economic Outlook 2011 - DRAFT 
BRICS development assistance 2008
Brazil, 437
China, 2400
India, 610
Russia, 200
S. Africa, 109
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Overall Development Assistance (ODA), Other Official Flows (OOF), Outward Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI), and trade volumes with developing countries 
 ODA
35
 OOF
36
 
Outward FDI
37 
Merchandise 
Export volume 
to developing 
economies in 
2009
38
 
Merchandise 
Import volume 
from developing 
economies in 
2009
39
 
Brazil 
$1-1,275 bn 
(2010)40 
n/a 
$0.15 bn (2007) $87.3 bn $61 bn 
India $ 0.61 bn  (2009) $2 bn (2010)
41 
$2.95 bn (2005) 
 
 [Africa $2.7 bn 
in 2008] 
$104 bn $164 bn 
China
42
 $1.9-3 bn (2008) 
$10bn (2009)  
[Africa $6 bn in 
2009] 43 
 
$13.26 bn (2009 
 
[Africa $7.8 bn in 
2008] 
$556 bn $545 bn 
Saudi Arabia 
$2.01 bn (2006) 
$2.01 bn (2007) 
$5.5 bn (2008) 
n/a 
n/a $141 bn $38 bn 
DAC members $120 bn (2009) 
$22 bn (2009) 
[$2.9 bn to 
Africa] 
 
$158.9 bn (2009) $2002 bn $2536 bn 
EU $67 bn (2009)
44 $3.5 bn (2009)45 
$94 bn (2009) $717 bn $816 bn 
Multilateral 
Institutions 
(DAC ODA 
includes 
multilateral 
contributions) 
$53.8 bn (2009) 
[$6.1 bn to 
Africa] 
n/a n/a n/a 
                                                 
35 Net ODA. All data from OECD (2010a). Estimates for non-OECD countries from OECD (2010b), unless 
otherwise indicated 
36 Gross OOF, DAC, EU and Multilateral Institution data from OECD 2010a. Estimates for non-OECD countries 
from OECD 2010b; loans are in many cases tied to goods and services of the lending EME 
37 UNCTAD (2010) and OECD (2010a). UNCTAD FDI data is collected for TNCs only. Data on DAC/EU is by 
OECD (2010a) and also includes SMEs 
38 UNCTAD 2010 
39 UNCTAD 2010 
40 Lower estimate by Overseas Development Institute (2010), upper estimate by German Development Institute 
(2010) 
41 Estimate by Indian officials at meeting with EU Delegation 
42 Note that Hong Kong SAR had TNC FDI of $5.3 bn into Africa in 2008 and account for $219 bn in 
merchandise export and $289 bn in merchandise import volume to and from developing countries. It is not 
possible to separate mainland Chinese TNCs that might have subsidiaries in HK from other TNCs. 
43 Estimate by Deborah Brautigam, mostly market rate loans from state banks 
44 EU OECD Member States 
45 EU OECD Member States 
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Alongside emerging countries, non-governmental actors, such as NGOs, foundations and 
private corporations, are also responsible for a significant amount of funds for development 
and are playing a growing foreign policy role. It is estimated that private philanthropy 
foundations, from both developed and developing countries, may account for about US $ 60 
billion annually46. While these funds are of a distinct nature and managed differently from 
ODA, together they could, if harnessed to complement ODA, better meet the need to foster 
development and tackle global challenges. 
 
The EU and its Member States already have a sophisticated policy framework in place to 
guide their joint work in helping their partner countries out of poverty, but a lot remains to be 
done.  
 
In addition, it must be noted that success of development endeavours is also a matter of shared 
objectives between the donors and the recipients of development aid. Recognising that its 
partner countries bear primary responsibility for defining their own development strategies 
while emphasising the key role of good governance, the EU and its Member States have 
moved from a donor-beneficiary type of relationship to a partnership47, involving contractual 
approaches, based on policy dialogue and linking results to specific cooperation programmes 
or instruments. 
 
Similar to other global challenges, in development, the EU as a whole has both an economic 
and a political role. These two aspects of EU development action are complementary. 
Politically, the EU conducts political dialogue both at the bilateral and at the multilateral 
levels. The EU institutions are also actively participating in development policy discussions 
with other donors in multilateral fora (UN, OECD, G20, IFIs). Bilaterally, the EU institutions 
support key sectors and help developing countries set governance systems and policies as well 
as build capacities to create conditions for inclusive growth and sustainable development.  
 
The Lisbon Treaty and the new institutional setting for the EU's common foreign and security 
policy has opened the door for a sharpened, more strategic development policy in the wider 
framework of more effective EU external action. The European External Action Service 
(EEAS) allows for better co-ordinated EU and Member State policies, programmes and 
delivery. 
 
The new institutional setting, as well as new competences in areas of interest for 
development48, also provides opportunities for increased coherence between external policy 
objectives and development. Through article 208 TFEU, the Lisbon Treaty has indeed given 
an important role to the Policy Coherence for Development (PCD) agenda, which should also 
contribute to improve the real results of our development cooperation by reducing 
inconsistencies and promoting synergies between the objectives of internal policies and 
development objectives.  
 
With this new institutional set-up for EU external action in place, and a Multi-Annual 
Financial Framework (MFF) to be agreed for the period after 2013, it is particularly opportune 
                                                 
46 Wolfgang Fengler, blogs.worldbank.org 1/10/2010.  
47 In recent years, the EU has established various partnership agreements that govern its relations with 
developing and emerging countries such as the Africa-EU Strategic Partnership, the revised Cotonou Agreement 
with ACP States, EU strategic partnerships with emerging and transition economies or the Central Asia Strategy. 
48 such as investment, migration 
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to examine the development policy framework within which the new external spending 
instruments will be developed49. 
 
 
2.2. Drivers of the problem 
 
Current research50 shows that since 2005, when the Paris Declaration was adopted, global aid 
allocation patterns have deteriorated. In general, aid fragmentation has increased in parallel to 
ODA increases. There is a trend to deliver assistance in smaller parcels. At the same time, 
donor proliferation has increased: globally, donors are operating in more countries and, within 
these countries, in more sectors.  
 
 
2.2.1. Aid fragmentation 
 
The Paris Declaration noted that "excessive fragmentation of aid at the global, country or 
sector level impairs aid effectiveness. It called for increased donor complementarity through 
delegated authority to improve division of labour and reduce transaction costs. Division of 
labour needs to be pursued both in-country and cross-country". 
 
Several studies point to the undermining effects of aid fragmentation and donor proliferation 
on the value for money and impact of aid. Fragmentation is considered to be a problem 
because its costs have been shown to be very large for recipients, to the point that it 
significantly reduces aid efficiency. Having to deal with a plethora of donor missions, 
reporting requirements and consultants considerably reduces the value of aid for recipients. It 
forces the use of a great deal of administrative resources in countries where these are often 
scarce and would be better employed elsewhere. 
 
Analysis of OECD/DAC statistics of 2008 and the sector policies of EU donors in three 
countries (Ethiopia, Vietnam and Zambia) show that EU donors are slowly reducing aid 
fragmentation through increased specialisation and division of labour. In all three countries 
EU donors intend to limit themselves to four sectors on average, close to the aim of a 
maximum of three sectors as laid down in the EU Code of Conduct on Division of Labour. 
 
The Commission itself has committed to limit its engagement to two sectors per country, but 
this rule has not been uniformly applied. While there is a general consistency of approach in 
ACP countries, in non-ACP countries the EU country programme commonly either involves a 
large number of sectors, exceeding the two-sector limit, or those two sectors are so broadly 
defined (e.g. as "human development," "rural development") as to in practice mean 
engagement in a very large number of sectors.  
 
A 2009 study on the 'Benefits of a European Approach'51 shows that applying the aid 
effectiveness principles can result in considerably better value for money. The study states 
                                                 
49 See results of the public consultation on "What funding for EU external action after 2013?" 
50 "Trends of In-country Aid Fragmentation and Donor Proliferation: An Analysis of Changes in Aid Allocation 
Patterns between 2005 and 2009", Report on behalf of the OECD Task Team on Division of Labour and 
Complementarity, First Draft – 24 March 2011, final version forthcoming 
51 "Aid Effectiveness Agenda: Benefits of a European Approach", HTPSE Limited, October 2009, 
http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/AE_Full_Final_Report_20091023.pdf  
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that if improvements were made in terms of increased predictability, reduced donor 
proliferation and a further untying of aid, the potential benefits from a European approach 
towards aid effectiveness could, with a full caveat for the paucity and uncertainty of actual 
data, be estimated to be in the magnitude of 3 to 6 billion Euro per year or 15 to 30 billion 
Euro over the period of 2010 to 2015. Of this amount between € 1 and 1.6 billion of 
efficiency gains could be achieved by a reduction in aid fragmentation. 
 
Other studies, for instance by the OECD/DAC52, also point to huge potential gains of 
reducing aid fragmentation. The OECD/DAC calculated that the traditional bilateral DAC 
donors established 3700 aid relationships in the world, leading to unmanageable numbers of 
donors in countries and across sectors. Not counted are the remaining 246 multilateral 
organisations, emerging donors and other non-DAC donors. The average number of 
"partners" per donor is 68, while the average number of donors that each partner has to deal 
with is 20 (10 bilaterals and 10 multilaterals). 
 
Map of total number of donors per recipient country (2009)
53 
 
 
 
It is widely accepted that these inefficiencies are no longer sustainable. Tackling this 
proliferation and fragmentation is made even more urgent by the fact that additional actors, 
such as emerging donors and private foundations, have entered the aid arena.  
 
                                                 
52 2010 Report on Division of Labour "Addressing cross-country fragmentation and aid orphans", OECD, Paris  
53 Idem 
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Graph indicating the decrease in project size and the increase in the number of projects 
between 1995 and 2008 
54
 
 
 
 
To address the problem of aid fragmentation, the EU Council adopted a Code of Conduct 
(2007) and an Operational Framework (2009) on Division of Labour (DoL) which provide a 
comprehensive approach to reducing donor proliferation and aid fragmentation through 
increased donor specialisation at EU level. 
 
After almost four years of DoL processes, and in view of the High Level Event on aid 
effectiveness in Busan, the EU is at crossroads on this issue. While the EU remains the most 
advanced donor community on DoL, progress has been too slow55. There are some success 
stories, but these are rather the exceptions and mostly due to occasional leadership and local 
initiatives. 
 
Sectoral fragmentation 
At the sector level proliferation is also rife: forty-one percent of all sectors in recipient 
countries had recorded disbursements from more than three EU donors in 2007. Forty-five 
percent of all EU donor sector programmes account for only twelve percent of total spending, 
implying that there are considerable economies of scale to be gained from rationalisation of 
projects and programmes.56 
 
In particular, a reduction in the fragmentation of aid from a large number of smaller projects 
into consolidated, longer term programmes, could increase this level of savings considerably. 
If, hypothetically, these fragmentation costs were reduced to 500 million Euro a year (for a 
consolidation into some 750 programmes), the additional savings, above and beyond the 3 to 
6 billion amount, would be in the magnitude of 1.4 to 2.5 billion Euro a year. While it is not 
possible to operate with precise figures, it is possible to establish that the potential savings are 
substantial and to infer that the link between aid fragmentation and DoL needs to be tackled 
further.57 
 
Existing agreements between the EU and Member States to reduce in-country fragmentation 
of their aid through DoL have not (yet) yielded the expected results for a number of reasons: 
                                                 
54  Fengler Wolfgang and Kharas Homi, "Delivering Aid Differently - Lessons from the Field", Brookings 
Institution Press 2010 c. 286pp. 
55 For more detailed information, refer to the three published Monitoring Reports on EU Fast Track Initiative on 
Division of Labour and Complementarity, January 2009, November 2009 and April 2011. 
56 "Aid effectiveness agenda: Benefits of the European Approach," European Commission, October 2009 
http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/AE_Full_Final_Report_20091023.pdf  
57 idem  
  18 
1. Neither the EU nor all Member States limit their aid in all partner countries to a 
maximum of three sectors of intervention, as agreed in the EU Code of Conduct. This 
may be due to political priorities, bilateral interests, visibility considerations, partner 
country requests or other reasons. 
2. Member States and EU may define their sectors of intervention too broadly (e.g. 
"human and social development" in the EU programme in Bangladesh), which 
actually allows them to work in a very large number of traditional sectors (human and 
social development encompasses health, education, water and sanitation, etc.) 
3. Vertical funds and facilities often finance projects outside agreed sectors of 
intervention and hence contribute to fragmentation of aid. 
4. While the advantages of reduced fragmentation through DoL may be obvious (e.g. the 
savings in transaction costs), they may not be easily quantifiable or immediately 
observable. On the other hand, more efficient DoL requires increased coordination and 
cooperation by donors, which is initially time consuming and labour intensive and thus 
can be considered a disadvantage. 
5. While lack of political direction (including appropriate communication of existing 
commitments to partner country level) may be one reason, the resistance to change by 
national administrations, implementing agencies and other interest groups that benefit 
from maintaining the status quo also plays an important role. 
6. Some partner country governments seem reluctant to support DoL processes for fear 
of losing funding. 
 
 
2.2.2. High cost coordination efforts, lack of division of labour 
 
In the current setting, there is a high proliferation of donor – partner country relationships. At 
country level, this results in high coordination efforts which burden first and foremost the 
partner countries, but also donor representatives in the field. In addition to these traditional 
relationships, there are new ones emerging, such as South-South relationships or big private 
foundations. While the EU donors are partly responsible for a high level of fragmentation, the 
appetite for fragmentation seems to have levelled off: their contribution to the increase in 
fragmentation is less than the global donor average. 
 
There are substantive global and EU-specific commitments to increase complementarity and 
enhance division of labour (DoL) among donors, as in the Paris Declaration (2005), the EU 
Code of Conduct on Division of Labour (2007), and the Accra Agenda for Action (2008). 
Better DoL between EU donors will increase transparency, reduce duplication and diminish 
the risk of corruption, and therefore would have a positive impact on development results.  
 
Specifically, EU donors set themselves an ambitious Code of Conduct on Division of Labour 
in 2007. In 2008, the EU Fast Track Initiative on Division of Labour was created, focusing on 
30 countries with often very high fragmentation levels in order to improve DoL. The latest 
monitoring report of the Fast Track Initiative58 showed mixed results. In many countries of 
the FTI, the technical preparations have been concluded in order to facilitate good, 
measurable re-organisation of labour among EU donors. There is widespread use and 
institutionalisation of donor mapping as an aid management tool and there is more agreement 
on sector definitions, lead donor arrangements etc. Also the perceived partner country 
                                                 
58 Third Monitoring Report and Progress Review of the EU Fast Track Initiative on Division of Labour, Annex 5 
of the "EU Accountability Report 2011 on Financing for Development - Review of progress of the EU and its 
Member States", Commission Staff Working Document, SEC(2011) 502 final 
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commitment to DoL processes seems to be improving. However, substantial measurable 
changes to donor behaviour are rare as a result of these preparations. It is a demanding 
approach that takes time to yield measurable results.  
 
There is a natural time lag between policy commitments and their visible effects on aid 
fragmentation statistics. Usually, if and when donors decide to exit a country or a sector in a 
country, they organise a careful exit phase that takes 3-5 years. That means the full effect of 
policy decisions taken on the basis of aid effectiveness commitments, or on the basis of the 
Code of Conduct on Division of Labour of 2007, are likely to show more clearly when aid 
data for 2010 or 2011 becomes available. 
 
However, the trend seems to point to the fact that progress has been too slow, even if the EU 
remains the most advanced donor community on DoL. There are some success stories, but 
these are rather the exceptions and mostly due to occasional partner country leadership. 
Technical approaches for pilot DoL exercises might have reached their limits, both in the field 
and headquarters. An agenda for change which emphasises greater EU coordination, including 
improved DoL, seems to be called for. 
 
Duplication of effort 
There is strong evidence of duplication of effort with other donors both inside and beyond the 
EU. Taking Bangladesh as an example, all 10 EU donors present in Bangladesh are active in 
the education sector. In Ethiopia, 11 of the 15 EU donors present crowd the health sector59. 
Individual donors' allocation decisions are based on a great diversity of criteria, often 
determined at headquarters' level and resulting in earmarking of funds at country level. This 
means that exits and entries from countries and sectors are hard to coordinate at country level 
and in partnership with the recipient governments. In many of these cases, information about 
each other's activities is abundant and coordination a daily fact. However, behavioural 
changes as a result of this information are scarce. 
 
This can lead to duplications, where the same sector and type of projects is invested in by 
several donors, leading to a competition locally that hinders any conditionality and does not 
necessarily lead to an improvement in quality. More importantly, it can also lead to sudden 
gaps in geographic/sector coverage, with costs in terms of lack of continuity and risks to the 
sustainability of achieved advances in certain sectors. Moreover, this lack of coordination 
added to the proliferation of interventions and donors create an atmosphere of uncertainty for 
partner countries and the main beneficiaries in these countries, very often including the most 
vulnerable groups.  
 
This complex and uncoordinated nature of aid allocation patterns not only creates overlaps 
and duplication in terms of too many donors contributing too little at country level, it also 
creates gaps in terms of overall supply of aid at country level (issue of under-aided countries, 
also known as "aid orphans"). 
 
                                                 
59 According to OECD DAC Fragmentation tables, based on disbursement data of 2009 
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Donor orphans 
Lack of proper coordination among donors, both at EU and global level, leads to 
unsatisfactory patterns of aid distribution. These trends are visible both at sector and country 
levels60. The resulting geographical and sectoral gaps are commonly called "aid orphans". 
 
The OECD61 indicated that such patterns generate inefficiency and inequities and can entail 
considerable global cost in delivering aid to the extent that the aid community as a whole fails 
to invest systematically where aid is expected to have the highest impact.  
 
This asymmetry is recognised in the Accra Agenda for Action and donors have committed "to 
start dialogue on division of labour across countries and work to address the issues of 
countries that receive insufficient aid"62. 
 
In the current climate of budgetary austerity in OECD countries, it is unlikely that the donor 
community can solve the problem of under-aided countries solely by providing aid resources 
that are additional to what would otherwise have been provided. Therefore, meeting aid 
orphans' needs from scaled-up resources will be difficult. Fragmentation can be improved by 
reducing non-significant aid relations. This would also free up resources that could be used 
towards aid orphans (assuming that there is an ex ante agreement on which countries are aid 
orphans). In this way, re-allocating resources could not only reduce aid fragmentation and 
transaction costs in partner countries where donor relations are non-significant, but at the 
same time provide more aid to aid orphans. 
 
As regards cross-country DoL, which aims at reducing the proliferation of aid donors in 
partner countries, there are also a number of reasons that have prevented progress: 
1. Many Member States consider their decisions on partner country selection as a 
sovereign act, which does not require EU coordination; equally partner countries see 
their relations with bilateral donors as a national prerogative. 
2. Selection of partner countries and country allocations is seen by many Member 
States as a national foreign policy instrument. 
3. A substantial number of partner country governments fear losing funding and are 
hence not supportive of cross-country DoL. 
 
2.2.3. Fragmentation of Commission-managed aid 
 
For the assessment of the fragmentation of the EC aid portfolio, the aid statistics of the 
OECD/DAC provide a useful input. The DAC distinguishes 11 sectors63 at the aggregate level 
(including multi sector), and General Budget Support (GBS) as a 12th element. 
 
Furthermore, to identify fragmentation the DAC uses the concept of Country Programmable 
Aid (CPA), which only includes ODA which is programmed by the donor and excludes ODA 
which: 
                                                 
60 "Will countries that receive insufficient aid please stand up"? Robert Utz, World Bank, 2009.   
61 OECD Development Brief, January 2009.  
62 Accra Agenda for Action, point 17 letter c) and d). September 2008 
63 Education; Health; Population policies and reproductive health; Water supply and sanitation; Other social 
infrastructure; Economic infrastructure; Agriculture; Other production sectors (e.g. forestry, fishing, industry, 
mining, trade policy and tourism); Environment; Government and civil society; Multisector; General budget 
support. 
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• is unpredictable by nature (humanitarian aid and debt relief); 
• entails no cross-border flows (administrative costs, imputed student costs, promotion 
of development awareness, and research and refugees in donor countries); 
• does not form part of co-operation agreements between governments (food aid and aid 
from local governments); and 
• is not country programmable by the donor (e.g. core funding of NGOs). 
 
With regard to the Commission portfolio, the intention had been to reduce fragmentation 
through the limitation of the number of focal sectors in the Country Strategy Papers (CSPs). 
DAC 2009 data on aid flows show that EC aid is still fragmented by spreading the funding 
over many sectors. On average, the EC is spreading its aid over 10 sectors (GBS not 
included), as illustrated in the 30 partner countries64 which are participating in the fast track 
approach for division of labour. The range is between 5 sectors (Mongolia) and 11 sectors (9 
countries). This is clearly much higher than the maximum of 3 focal sectors the EU Code of 
Conduct for Division of Labour called for in May 2007. Of these 10 sectors, the Commission 
provides a relatively large contribution to 6 sectors on average, which indicates that the 
Commission needs to spread out its human capacity and financial resources to manage the 
programmes in these sectors.  
 
Fragmentation at country level 
 
In some countries and regions, focal sectors are defined in a very open way, which often leads 
to very scattered interventions. Indeed, there are cases where the two focal sectors may be 
defined as "rural development" and "urban development", or as "economic integration" and 
"political integration". This often leads to programmes covering many subsectors in fields that 
are as different as health, education, culture, infrastructures, environment, trade, etc., with a 
wide variety of specialised human resources needed for the implementation of the 
programmes and numerous interlocutors. 
 
For example, in a northern African country the two focal sectors of EU development 
cooperation are "sustainable development and culture" and "economic growth and 
employment". In practice, projects approved and implemented cover all the following sub-
sectors: "culture and heritage", "transport" , "fisheries", "trade", "environment" and "socio-
economic development", all requiring very different expertises and dialogues with six 
different ministries. 
 
Another country, further south in Africa, is in the same type a situation: 3 focal sectors but 
numerous sub-sectors, with not less than 22 ongoing projects. 
 
Examples of lack of concentration can also be found in other continents, like in one Middle 
Eastern country with "administrative reforms", "economic reforms" and "social reforms" as 
focal sectors. In practice, this leads to programmes being implemented in "health", 
"education", "justice", "social protection", "vocational training", "support to civil society", 
"support to private sector", "banking reform", "trade", and "administrative reforms". In a 
Central Asian country, EU development aid gave rise to not less than 383 service contracts in 
a 6 year period. 
                                                 
64 Bangladesh, Benin, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, 
Ethiopia, Ghana, Haiti, Kenya, Kyrgyz Republic, Laos, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Moldova, Mongolia, 
Mozambique, Nicaragua, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Tanzania, Uganda, Ukraine, Vietnam and 
Zambia. 
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Further breakdown of EU65 presence shows that the EU is highly significant66 in 3.5 sectors 
(58% of funding) and reasonably significant in 2.5 sectors (12%). The EU is insignificant in 4 
sectors (5%). This means that the EU is significant in a total of 6 sectors, while being 
insignificant in 3.5 sectors. A little more than half of the countries receive General Budget 
Support, which accounts for the remaining 25% of the total funding, and which is significant 
across the board.  
 
Comparison of DAC statistics with Country Strategy Papers 
 
Additional analysis consists of a comparison between the actual presence in sectors according 
to the 2009 DAC data and the sectors as laid down in Country Strategy Papers (CSPs). In 
general, CSP sectors are broadly defined, so in some cases they overlap with more than one 
sector in the DAC definition (for instance, a CSP refers to "social sector" which involves 
Education and Health in the DAC sector definition). In most CSPs (25 out of 30) a distinction 
has been made between focal and non-focal sectors. In terms of share of the total funding it 
should be noted that the 3 focal sectors only account for 42%, while activities in non-focal 
sectors and other areas of intervention outside the CSPs amount a considerable 33% spread 
over 7 sectors on average. This seems to be an unbalanced situation. In the implementation 
phase of the CSPs more discipline is needed to keep spending focused on the defined (focal) 
sectors and resist the tendency to spread funding to other areas of intervention.  
 
There is thus considerable opportunity to further downsize the number of sectors by limiting 
or even abolishing the non-focal sectors in the country programming process. Furthermore, a 
more strict approach for defining focal sectors could be applied. 
 
Geographic dispersion of aid 
Commission-managed aid could be more targeted at those countries that need it most. For 
instance, the DCI covers a wide range of countries falling under the OECD DAC definition of 
ODA recipients, from the LDCs to Upper Middle Income Countries. Hence, a certain amount 
of aid is being delivered to countries that have strong financing capacity (such as China and 
Turkey). In the case of Angola for example, all aid represents less than 1% of the national 
budget. 67 For these countries, the benefit of EU development aid is likely to be minimal.  
 
Given the very different development needs, performance and interests of each country, the 
DCI does not allow sufficient differentiation between the partners. The rise of several 
developing countries as donors, the economic and social disparities amongst the partner 
countries and the development of new objectives beyond pure development assistance call for 
an enhanced flexibility in terms of objectives and cooperation modalities within the DCI68.  
 
Such fragmentation does not allow a critical mass to be obtained and so prevents large-scale 
projects in some countries where such projects would be the most appropriate. For example, 
                                                 
65 In this context, "EU" refers to "Commission-managed aid." 
66 The DAC distinguishes between "significant" and "non-significant" contributions to a sector. Highly 
significant means that the donor has a relative large financial contribution to the sector both from the donor and 
the partner country perspective. Reasonably significant means either a large financial contribution from the 
donor or from the partner country perspective. +on-significant means that the financial contribution is relatively 
small from both perspectives.  
67 See Annex. 
68 Report of the Working Group – Multiannual Financial Framework, 'What works and what doesn't?' March 
2011, not published. 
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in the Pacific region, while the EU strategy was relevant and in line with the national requests 
and needs, EU support was dispersed over too many sectors and islands and therefore impact 
and visibility were diluted. 
 
In 2007, the DAC Peer Review69 urged the Commission to work with the EU Member States 
to differentiate better their respective roles in countries and to prioritise the sectors it targets 
for assistance and slim downwards the number of countries to which it provides ODA. 
 
Lack of prioritisation  
The reasons for a lack of prioritisation are at least partly political, given that many Member 
States see the Commission as the donor of last resort, filling the gaps and ensuring the EU 
global presence.  
 
A study on legal instruments for external action70 examining 57 evaluations published 
between 2006 and 2010, found 130 results and impacts that were linked to the DCI; 40% of 
these were judged to be relevant though ineffective (e.g. project-level results in terms of 
gender equality not translating into societal change; increases in school enrolment while the 
quality of education remains too low to expect literacy rates to change), or were too small 
scale in terms of coverage or investment to really make a difference (roughly one third of the 
evidence). 
 
 
2.2.4. Other key drivers of the problem 
Other ways/tools/drivers to improve EU aid impact 
 
 
 
External factors 
EU development aid does not operate in an isolated environment. Other factors influence the 
final results and the capacity of EU development aid to generate real results in terms of 
poverty eradication. Among these factors, many are outside of the EU's and/or Commission's 
direct control or influence. Most obvious would be natural or man-made disasters which can 
set developing countries back.  
 
Policy Coherence for Development 
In terms of other factors, one of the most significant is the seeming inconsistencies and 
incoherencies between the effects (and side effects) of non-development policies and the 
objective of development policy. Policy coherence for development (PCD) approaches, which 
are EU's main response to this weakness, are not new. Looking for synergies and avoiding 
negative impacts of non-development policies on development objectives is a long term 
process and continuous activity for the EU (Commission and Member States alike) that is 
based on the Treaty. Furthermore, the ‘European Consensus on Development’ reaffirms the 
EU’s commitment to promoting PCD, based on the principle of ensuring that the EU shall 
take account of the objectives of development cooperation in all policies that it implements 
which are likely to affect developing countries, and that these policies support development 
objectives. This approach is to be encouraged and will have to be part of any final policy mix, 
no matter which future Option is selected. 
                                                 
69 DAC Peer Review of the European Community 2007, p. 18, 39, 40, 43 
70 DCI, ENPI, EIDHR, INSC, Ifs and ICI 
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Country ownership 
Country ownership and good governance are key elements for success. Experience has shown 
that without them, aid programmes will not produce their highest impact. Partner countries 
bear the primary responsibility for defining their own development strategies. Limited 
progress in the past can, to a certain extent, be attributed to a lack of ownership and mutual 
accountability. 
 
As regards division of labour, an important lesson is that concrete progress is only possible 
with country ownership and flexibility (i.e. avoid blueprint approaches). However, most 
partner countries lack incentives because of fear of losing overall funding or reduced room for 
manoeuvre if donors work collectively. 
 
In order to increase the impact of its development policy, the EU and its partner countries 
must therefore strengthen their partnerships, focusing on results and ensuring mutual 
accountability. In doing so, the EU can better leverage policy reforms, notably in terms of 
good governance. Again, these improvements would apply across the board, and not solely in 
relation to one or two of the Options considered in this Impact Assessment process.  
 
Other financial resources 
EU effort may leverage additional finance for development. A growing number of actors are 
playing an increasingly important role in development cooperation and are responsible for a 
significant amount of funds for development71. While these funds are of a distinct nature and 
managed differently from ODA, together they could, if harnessed to complement ODA, better 
meet the need to foster development and tackle global challenges. For example, the 
Commission will consider developing blending mechanisms to boost financial resources for 
development. Certain Options may allow for greater resource mobilisation than others, as 
explained below.  
 
Partnerships with emerging donors  
The most important missed opportunity from our lack of cooperation with emerging 
economies (EMEs) in other developing countries (especially a lack of cooperation with China 
in Africa) is the chance to support the key to Africa's future growth – regional integration72 – 
through strategic trilateral cooperation to mobilise European excellence in the creation of a 
single market and China's comparative advantage in the fast construction of low-cost 
infrastructure. In that regard, the EU will notably explore how to strengthen strategic 
partnerships with emerging economies. 
 
 
 
                                                 
71 For example, global remittances from migrants were expected to amount to around EUR 237 billion in 2010, 
private charities are by some calculations estimated to provide about EUR 35 billion annually; global Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI) flows are about equal to ODA. 
72 The November 2010 communication on the future of EU-Africa relations reiterated the importance of regional 
integration in EU policies 
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Problem and its main drivers 
 
 
 
 
 
Policy focus: 
EU aid is too 
sectorally 
dispersed  
Differentiation: 
EU aid too 
geographically 
dispersed  
 
 
Implementation of 
PCD Agenda 
 
Leveraging 
additional 
financial 
resources  
 
Country 
ownership 
 
 
Partnerships with 
other actors / 
donors 
 
 
Aid modalities + 
instruments 
 
Aid effectiveness: 
Weak EU 
coordination & 
DoL with EU MS 
 
PROBLEM: 
eed to 
increase impact 
of COM 
managed aid 
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3. Scope of the Communication 
 
Development policy is only partly about aid; other non-aid aspects (such as trade policy, loans 
and other financial flows) have an equally important part to play in the overall policy for 
promoting global development. This Impact Assessment however focuses on the 
Commission-managed aid as the main measurable indicator and the area where most 
significant change, as compared with the status quo, is proposed.  
 
The Impact Assessment thus deals with issues relating to EU institutions' aid, which are under 
Commission competence, and through which the Communication can have the most direct 
impact.  
 
The Communication addresses specific drivers, based on the following criteria: 
1) Those on which Commission has an immediate and direct influence; 
2) Those that are not dealt with in other policy initiatives (e.g. governance, PCD) or in 
forthcoming proposals (e.g. financial instruments, coordination & joint programming); 
3) Those that do not concern the implementation of policies. 
 
As these are the areas of significant change proposed in the Communication, the Impact 
Assessment focuses on the following two drivers: 
- Policy focus: sectoral concentration of aid 
- Differentiation: geographical concentration of aid 
 
This focus of the Impact Assessment notwithstanding, all drivers of the problems should also 
be taken into consideration and acted upon in order to improve EU development policy and 
make it deliver improved results in terms of MDGs. In particular, non-development policies 
also have a strong bearing on the impact of aid.  
 
 
4. Analysis of subsidiarity 
 
Development policy is a shared, "parallel" competence (Article 4 TFEU), implying that the 
Member States have parallel powers with the EU, have their own aid programmes and 
policies and exercise their powers, while ensuring that these complement and reinforce those 
of other Member States and the EU (Article 208 TFEU).  
 
EU necessity to act: 
The Treaty states that development policy is a shared, parallel competence between the 
Commission and Member States; it reserves a specific role for the Commission in 
development policy. 
Commission-managed aid has to be spent in accordance with the Treaty development 
objectives (i.e. poverty reduction, cf. Art 21 TEU and 208 TFEU).  
 
 
EU action is necessary as action by the Member States alone cannot sufficiently fulfil this 
function. Given the Treaty call for complementarity between the EU and its Member States in 
development cooperation, the EU and Member States are committed to donor coordination 
and the EU is mandated to take initiatives to promote such coordination (Art.210 TFEU).  
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EU added value:  
The EU provides added value: 
§ through its global network of delegations, which gives it a political presence where 
Member States may not;  
§ by championing PCD (especially given its exclusive competence in trade); 
§ by promoting best development practice; 
§ by facilitating coordination and harmonisation; 
§ by acting as a delivery agent, particularly where size/critical mass are important; 
§ by promoting certain values and principles (e.g. democracy, human rights, good 
governance, including transparency and anti-corruption); 
§ by promoting and facilitating civil society participation and North-South solidarity. 
 
Coordinated action by the EU as a whole has an added value that, in terms of policy and 
financial leverage, is bigger than the sum of individual action of 27 Member States and the 
Commission.73 Beyond being itself an important donor, the EU also plays the important role 
of federating actions of the EU and its Member States towards a unified EU presence in the 
global scene, capable of playing the political role that the provider of more than 50% of global 
ODA should have. The EU monitors progress and proposes possible actions to Member 
States. The Commission has a key role in coordinating EU action, proposing common 
positions for international events74 and driving forward common approaches to, for example, 
aid effectiveness and division of labour, including through the proposals it makes for 
development policy via regular Communications to the Council.    
 
In similar vein, a recent study found that the European Consensus has a greater value as a 
single document than the sum of its individual elements, precisely due to its role in bringing 
Member States and the Commission together behind a single agenda and in giving the EU's 
development policy external visibility75.  
 
In order to maximise this added value, greater specialisation and better division of labour 
could lead to greater efficiency, economies of scale and lower transaction costs whose 
benefits could be used to further reinforce the financial resources available and to enhance the 
EU's negotiating/ bargaining power, thus ensuring that the EU is better placed to play a 
leading role at global level. 
 
5. Objectives of EU initiative 
 
As stated by the Treaty, the main objective of EU development policy is poverty reduction in 
the context of sustainable development. The internationally-recognised targets under this 
objective, subscribed to by the EU, are the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).Given 
                                                 
73 As demonstrated above with reference to the study on the aid effectiveness agenda: benefits of the European 
Approach  from October 2009 
http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/AE_Full_Final_Report_20091023.pdf  
74EU positions have helped to achieve ambitious global agreements (e.g. Paris Declaration in 2005; Accra 
Agenda for Action in 2008; Doha Financing for Development Conference in 2008). Common EU positions were 
also adopted ahead of the UN General Assembly High-Level Plenary Meeting on the MDGs in 2010 and the 
LDC IV Conference in 2011. 
75 Feasibility Study for the Future Evaluation of the Implementation of Part II of the  
European Consensus on Development, ECDPM for the European Commission, November 2010.  
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the effort still needed if the MDGs are to be reached by 2015, the EU needs to rapidly 
increase the impact of its aid on poverty reduction. Beyond 2015, the EU will need to 
continue to support the global effort until poverty is eliminated completely. The objective of 
the proposed change programme is therefore to ensure that every euro of EU development aid 
generates the greatest possible impact on poverty in developing countries, in order to 
maximise the contribution made by the EU to the MDGs and longer-term poverty elimination.  
One way of doing so is by sharpening the sectoral and/or geographical focus of EU aid. By 
focusing EU aid more strategically and concentrating on certain sectors and/or countries, the 
Commission will contribute to reducing the sectoral fragmentation and geographical 
dispersion of EU aid, hence increasing impact.   
 
 
 
 Objectives table  
General objective Poverty reduction in the context of sustainable development is the 
primary aim of EU development policy (Art 21 TEU, Art 208 TFEU). 
The MDGs constitute the most comprehensive set of internationally 
agreed benchmarks for development progress. 
 
Intermediate 
objective(s) 
Maximised impact of EU development aid on poverty reduction, 
MDGs achievement and sustainable development by 2015 and 
beyond (2020) 
Specific objectives Sharpened development policy focus for better results 
 
Operational 
objectives 
a) Direct Commission-managed aid where it is most needed and 
where it has the greatest impact on poverty reduction  
b) Use Commission's comparative advantage to focus Commission 
managed development aid 
c) Increase the capacity of Commission managed aid to leverage 
financial resources for development. 
d) Increase the capacity of Commission managed aid to leverage 
policy change. 
e) Improve EU development policy coordination and division of 
labour 
f) Strengthen legitimacy, credibility, visibility, relevance and public 
support for development aid (need to recognise the complexities 
of showing results of aid) 
g) Improve results-monitoring and reporting to demonstrate 
achievements and constantly learn and improve development 
interventions for further improved results 
 
6. Policy options 
 
 
As previously stated, the policy options assessed in this IA focus on Commission-managed 
aid, as it is here that the most significant changes are proposed and which are at the core of 
the problematic. Whichever option is chosen, and in line with existing EU commitments, the 
main objective of EU development policy would remain poverty eradication, with the MDGs 
  29 
as the main benchmarks against which to measure progress. PCD continues to be a necessary 
complement to reinforce EU development policy and aid effectiveness. Given that actions to 
improve PCD and aid effectiveness and the choice of aid modalities  are equally applicable to 
all options, the impact of changes in these areas is not assessed here. 
 
 
Option 1 Status quo 
The aid allocation and implementation processes would not change from the current 
portfolio. The Commission would continue to allocate grant aid to, and intervene in, a great 
variety of sectors and all countries. In other words, the EU would continue to do 
"everything everywhere". 
 
Commission-managed aid programmes are aimed at the achievement of MDGs, and in line 
with the European Consensus on Development, cover a wide array of sectors76 (e.g. health, 
education, environment, agriculture, infrastructure, etc.). In addition to the 9 sectors listed in 
the European Consensus, the EU's offer depends on the demand expressed in the dialogue 
with each developing country. 
 
Commission-managed aid would continue to be allocated to all ODA-eligible countries77, 
including Middle Income Countries (MICs) and emerging donors. 
 
In such a scenario, there would be no geographical differentiation of aid and the Commission 
would continue to act as a donor of last resort, maintaining a global EU development presence 
and providing development aid where other donors (including Member States) do not. 
 
 
Option 2 Sectoral focus 
In order to reduce the sectoral dispersion of EU aid, the Commission would focus mainly 
on a limited number of sectors, but would continue to provide aid to all countries ranging 
from the LDCs to BRICS. 
 
In order to move towards sharpened sectoral concentration and specialisation, Commission-
managed aid would be focused on a limited number of sectors (i.e. the "offer" is reduced). 
 
The EU would use its comparative advantage wherever possible in the context of country-led 
dialogues, in line with the principle of ownership. 
 
Many respondents to the public consultation on the Green Paper on EU development policy 
insisted on the need for a more focused EU aid and a consolidation of the more than 45,000 
projects funded by EU donors, combined with further division of labour among EU donors. 
Furthermore, the public consultation on future funding for EU external action has underlined 
that the EU should exploit its comparative advantage linked to its global field presence, its 
wide-ranging expertise, its supranational nature, its role as facilitator of coordination, and to 
the economies of scale. 
                                                 
76 The European Consensus states for example that the Community will concentrate its activities in the following 
areas: trade and regional integration; the environment and the sustainable management of natural resources; 
infrastructures; water and energy; rural development, agriculture, and food security; governance, democracy, 
human rights and support for economic and institutional reforms; prevention of conflicts and of state fragility;  
human development; and social cohesion and employment but the list of sectors is not exhaustive 
77 As per the DAC definition of ODA recipients 
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In that regard, areas of specialisation for policy focus could be determined by the following 
criteria: 
- Where the EU has a good track record: focusing on sectors where the 
Commission has acquired sound experience and knowledge and where EU action 
has produced good and sustainable results (e.g. governance, education). 
- Where the EU has gained significant expertise internally: focusing on sectors 
where the EU can provide useful support based on its own successful experience 
(e.g. regional integration) 
- Where the EU wants to be active: focusing on sectors which are considered 
priorities for the EU (e.g. food security; climate change) 
- Where MS alone cannot make the difference: focusing on sectors where there is 
clear added value for EU coordinated action in terms of policy and financial 
leverage (e.g. support to large-scale sectoral programmes) 
- Demand by partner countries: focusing on priority sectors as determined in the 
context of country-led dialogues. 
- Growth generating sectors: focusing on sectors which can induce strong and 
sustained inclusive growth (e.g. agriculture; energy) 
 
In order to be effective and avoid any "orphan sectors", the Commission's limited sectoral 
offer will need to be complemented by other donors or other instruments. This implies 
reinforced coordination and division of labour between the Commission and the Member 
States so as to ensure that demand and needs of partner countries are satisfied.  
 
Under this option, no geographical differentiation would be made in terms of aid recipients: 
Commission-managed development aid would continue to be allocated to all developing 
countries. 
 
 
Option 3 Geographical focus 
In order to reduce the geographical dispersion of EU aid, the Commission would target its 
grant aid towards on a limited number of countries (depending on their needs, capacities, 
and commitments and potential impact), but would continue to have a wide sectoral 
coverage. 
 
The Commission would apply a differentiated approach to aid allocation and partnerships, 
based on a comprehensive political and policy dialogue with all partner countries through 
which the EU will define the most appropriate form of cooperation, leading to informed and 
objective decisions on the most effective policy mix, aid levels, financial instruments and aid 
arrangements.  A vast majority of respondents to the public consultation on future funding for 
EU external action support the need for a more differentiated approach, tailored to the 
situation of the beneficiary country, based on sound criteria and efficient data collection, to be 
used as a way to increase the impact of EU financial Instruments. 
 
Many respondents to the public consultation on the Green paper on EU development policy 
have stressed that traditional ODA should be primarily reserved for the poorest countries.  
 
In that regard, EU development aid could be allocated according to needs, capacities and 
performance and to potential EU impact. 
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- Country needs will be assessed on the basis of several indicators, taking into account, 
inter alia, their economic and social/human development and growth path, so as to 
distinguish between those already on a strong and sustained path and those yet to 
reach such a stage. The EU will also pay special attention to vulnerability and fragility 
indicators. 
- Capacities and resources will be assessed according to a country's ability to generate 
sufficient financial resources, notably domestic resources, and its access to other 
sources of finance, such as international markets, private investments or natural 
resources. 
- Country commitments and performance: aid allocations will be adapted to reward 
investment in education and health, progress on the environment, democracy and State 
effectiveness, sound economic and fiscal policies and absorption capacities. 
- Potential EU impact will be measured through two horizontal objectives: 1) 
Increasing the extent to which the EU's cooperation promotes and supports economic, 
social and environmental policy reforms in partner countries; 2) Increasing the 
leveraging effect that EU aid can have on other sources of finance for development, in 
particular private investment. 
 
Through comprehensive political and policy dialogue with all partner countries, the EU would 
define the most appropriate form of cooperation, leading to informed and objective decisions 
on the most effective policy mix, aid levels, financial instruments and aid arrangements. 
 
For some countries (notably emerging economies and a number of upper middle-income 
countries), this may result in the cessation or lowering of EU development assistance, and the 
pursuit of a different cooperation relationship based on loans, technical cooperation or support 
for trilateral cooperation, as well as on a shared agenda around common interests and for 
global public goods (e.g. climate change, migration), while supporting them as they become 
donors themselves. 
 
In such a scenario, the Commission no longer provides aid as a gap-filler in countries where 
there are no other donors (no longer donor of last resort/default donor), and no longer ensures 
a global EU aid presence. 
 
Commission-managed development aid would still cover a wide array of sectors depending 
on the demand as established by the dialogue with each developing country. 
 
 
Option 4 Sectoral and geographical focus 
The EU would focus both sectorally and geographically (combination of Options 2 and 3) 
 
Under this final Option, Commission-managed aid not only would be focused on a limited 
number of sectors but would also be targeted to a limited number of countries. 
 
The choice of sectors would be made as under Option 2. 
 
The choice of countries to receive grant aid would be made as under Option 3.  
 
A basic assumption of this option is that Commission-managed aid would be complemented 
by other donors or other instruments. This implies reinforced coordination and division of 
labour among the Commission, Member States and other donors to ensure that the demands 
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and needs of partner countries are met. Such reinforced coordination would also be required 
under Options 2 and 3, but the picture will be more complex, and the importance greater, in 
the case of Option 4, where both sectoral and geographic portfolios need to be considered; 
this implies not just in-country DoL but also cross country DoL and well-informed and 
coordinated exit and entry strategies.  
 
 
7. Assessment of impacts 
 
Each of the four options is assessed against the following appraisal criteria: 
- EU presence and influence; 
- EU expertise/specialisation; 
- Dispersion and fragmentation of EU aid (sectorally and/or geographically); 
- Validity of current policy framework and agreements; 
- Potential leverage effect of EU aid / EU critical mass; 
- EU visibility, reputation, credibility and legitimacy; 
- EU commitments (ODA, aid effectiveness, MDGs). 
 
 
Option 1 – Status quo option 
 
Under the status quo option, Commission-managed aid would continue to be delivered to a 
wide range of sectors and beneficiary countries. The Commission would thus maintain a 
global and cross-sectoral presence potentially giving it influence across the board and possible 
leverage effect in all countries. This status quo option does not tackle the problem of aid 
dispersion and fragmentation, thereby increasing the risks of inefficiency. Moreover, scarce 
aid resources continue to be spread too thinly, resulting in reduced impact and a missed 
opportunity to increase the relevance, legitimacy and visibility of EU aid.  
 
STREGTHS WEAKESSES 
Global EU development presence is 
maintained (political visibility) 
Fragmentation and dispersion of aid is not 
tackled (missed opportunity) 
Global presence allows access & potential 
influence in all countries, and possible 
leverage effect on non-aid issues 
Scarce resources spread too thinly (no critical 
mass), resulting in low impact.  
Commission continues to be donor of last 
resort, reassuring for developing countries 
Aid continues to be allocated to countries that 
either do not need or deserve it, thus 
encouraging moral hazard (beneficiary 
countries assume they will all receive aid, 
creating less incentive for reform) 
Global presence allows flexibility and 
capacity to react to crises on the ground 
everywhere 
Impact of aid in certain countries  remains 
negligible (waste of resources + reputational 
risk)  
European Consensus remains valid Poor articulation of countries' specific needs  
No need for change in current agreements 
(e.g. Cotonou Agreement) 
High risks of inefficiency, affects COM/EU 
reputation 
COM expertise spread too thinly  
Division of labour & donor coordination 
made more complex leading to administrative 
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STREGTHS WEAKESSES 
burden & high transaction costs (both for EU 
and partner countries) 
Risk of aid dependency 
Difficulty in meeting the EU's commitments 
for Sub-Saharan Africa and LDCs as aid is 
spread too thinly  
Inability to do large-scale projects as funds 
per country are too small 
In the long run, EU aid loses relevance and 
legitimacy because of lack of impact 
 
Winners/losers 
 
Winners: BRICS & Middle Income developing countries (who continue to receive aid); 
Member States (who can still count on the Commission to fill gaps);  
 
Losers: poorest and fragile countries (from whom aid is being diverted); EU taxpayers (sub-
optimal value for money) 
 
 
Option 2 – Sectoral focus  
 
Sectoral concentration runs the risk of creating a possible mismatch between the 
Commission's limited offer and demand from partner countries. This could result in 
difficulties in spending all resources. In addition, a top-down approach to sectoral 
concentration would undermine country ownership (a key ingredient for aid effectiveness and 
overall success of development). This said, the Commission would maintain its global 
development presence, thus allowing it to maintain its potential influence and possible 
leverage effect in all countries. 
 
Sharpened sectoral focus would however contribute to higher impact of EU aid by 
concentrating resources on a limited number of sectors, thus increasing the EU's critical mass. 
This could also increase specialised expertise, visibility and reputation of the EU in a number 
of sectors where it has recognised comparative advantage. With proper division of labour at 
country level, the problem of mismatch with country needs is likely to be mitigated.  
 
This option would likely require a significant reorganisation of human resources in both 
DEVCO headquarters and in delegations, to ensure sufficient skills in the focal sectors and to 
reallocate staff away from non-focal sectors. Significant capacity-building/training 
programmes are likely to be required. The successful implementation of this Option would 
rest on rapid redeployment of staff and appropriate up-skilling.  
 
STREGTHS WEAKESSES 
Critical mass through concentration of 
resources on limited number of sectors 
(potential for much greater impact) 
Aid still goes to countries that don't need it 
and/or don't deserve it (waste of resources + 
reputational risk) 
Concentration of aid and better division of 
labour among donors reduces aid 
fragmentation and transaction costs of both 
Danger of aid dependency and lowered 
incentive for reform (every country 
automatically receives aid) 
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STREGTHS WEAKESSES 
the Commission and partner countries, 
thereby increasing the efficiency of aid 
Global presence allows flexibility and 
capacity to react to crises on the ground 
everywhere 
Scarce resources & COM expertise continue 
to be spread too thinly geographically (waste 
of resources, potential for impact self-
limiting) 
Increased visibility and reputation in certain 
key sectors 
Possible mismatch between EU's limited offer 
and demand from developing countries, which 
could ultimately make global presence 
impossible (notably from countries whose 
needs don't match EU offer) 
In the long-run, specialised expertise and 
staff (leads to more efficiency), could 
enhance reputation 
Top-down approach undermines aid 
effectiveness principles (+knock-on negative 
effect on EU reputation) 
No a priori reduction in global presence  In the long run, EU aid loses relevance and 
legitimacy + risk of losing credibility in 
representing the EU at large on EU 
development policy (loss of intellectual 
leadership) 
Easier to monitor impact/results Could undermine MDG commitments 
(notably in those sectors where EU will no 
longer be present and especially without 
adequate DoL which could see Member States 
concentrate on those sectors where the EU 
can no longer be active) 
Risk of losing market share by specialising 
too much (vis-à-vis other donors, notably 
BRICS) 
Problem of spending all resources (may lead 
to an inflation of vertical funds and 
programmes + competition with vertical 
funds) 
 
European Consensus would need revision (if 
Commission chooses to focus its offer on 
certain sectors exclusively) 
 
Winners/losers 
 
Winners: Developing countries whose demand fits EU offer; Member States who can focus 
on other sectors (complementarity); NGOs who implement programmes in the EU's priority 
sectors. 
 
Losers: Developing countries whose demand doesn't match EU offer; NGOs who received 
money until now but whose sectors of intervention no longer match EU sectors of 
concentration/priority; Member States who rely on the Commission to act in sectors where 
they cannot act themselves, but which they consider important for the MDGs 
 
 
Option 3 – Geographical focus 
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Geographical focus might run the risk of weakening EU influence and leverage effect in 
certain countries and regions where it no longer delivers grant aid. This problem will likely be 
mitigated by strategies of gradual exit and the continuation of non-aid development 
relationships with those countries where the EU ceases to have a grant aid programme (e.g. 
loans, trilateral cooperation, knowledge transfer). Member States may also take over the aid 
programme in countries where the Commission can no longer act, thus maintaining EU 
presence and influence. 
 
This said, in the absence of enhanced coordination and division of labour between EU and 
Member States, this Option risks widening the gap between donor darlings and donor 
orphans, especially at a time when an increasing number of EU donors are reducing their 
portfolio and exiting from a number of developing countries. Improved information exchange, 
active coordination and phased exits and entries, with flexibility offered by the EU and MS if 
required, should mitigate against this problem.  
 
The greatest advantage of a sharpened geographical focus is that is would target limited 
resources to those countries where they are needed most and where they have the greatest 
impact, thus avoiding wastage of taxpayers' money and allowing critical mass to build up in 
certain of the most needy or vulnerable countries, including donor orphans.  The Commission 
would in turn likely receive a boost to its reputation as a strategic player focused on 
eliminating poverty and not shying away from working in the poorest, most vulnerable and 
most difficult countries. It could enhance its global reputation as a donor with the specialised 
knowledge and skills to work in specific countries or regions. 
 
As with Option 2, this Option will require significant reorganisation of human resources 
within DEVCO and delegations.  
 
STREGTHS WEAKESSES 
Targeted aid to those countries which need it 
the most and where the impact will be 
greatest, giving greater value for money and 
reduced wastage 
In absence of efficient division of labour and 
donor coordination, risk of creating more 
donor orphans and donor darlings 
Opportunity for more modern relationships 
with wealthier developing countries, 
including spin-offs in terms of positive 
impacts on global public goods 
Possible loss of EU influence in certain 
regions and countries 
Increased critical mass in certain countries COM resources still dispersed in many sectors 
Reinforces the role of the COM as 
coordinator for DoL 
Uncertainty over addressing sub-regional & 
cross-regional challenges (if the EU has a 
patchy country coverage in a region) 
EU more likely to meet its commitments for 
Sub-Saharan Africa and LDCs 
Uncertainty of criteria for differentiation 
(higher risk of real or perceived 
politicisation/polarisation of aid) 
Strengthened legitimacy in policy debates on 
countries where COM is present (intellectual 
leadership) 
Allows COM to achieve a more balanced and 
strategic role as donor (less open to criticism) 
Over time, COM will strengthen its 
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STREGTHS WEAKESSES 
knowledge and understanding of specific 
focal countries/regions, thereby improving 
the appropriateness of its work, its local 
relationships and influence, and ultimately 
development results.  
 
Winners/losers 
 
Winners: Mostly LDCs/LICs who may see aid allocation increasing; NGOs in relevant focal 
countries 
 
Losers: Mostly MICs who may see their aid allocation declining; potentially, segments of 
poor people in wealthier MICs if their governments prove unwilling or unable to support them 
in lieu of donor resources; NGOs focused on these countries and regions and which will no 
longer receive financing; Member States who rely on the EU to deliver "their" aid in countries 
where they no longer operate themselves.  
 
 
Option 4 – Sectoral and geographical focus 
 
This Option combines the benefits of Options 2 and 3. By concentrating its resources on a 
limited number of sectors and by targeting resources to those countries where they are most 
needed and where they have greatest impact, the Commission could ensure a more strategic 
use and allocation of scarce aid resources, which is more in tune with the global context and 
the needs of both partner countries and the EU itself, as well as ensuring improved value for 
money for the European taxpayer.   
 
Several of the limitations of Options 2 and 3 stemmed from the fact that they were partial 
options, tackling only one aspect of the problem, rather than the problem of fragmentation and 
proliferation as a whole; some elements of a partial option could also prove unworkable (e.g. 
Option 2: if the principle of ownership were to be fully respected, but the EU's sectoral offer 
limited to only a few sectors, there may be countries where there is no match between the 
EU's offer and the country's demand, thus making an aid programme impossible and a global 
presence therefore unachievable).  
 
Option 4, by combining sectoral with geographic focus in a strategic decision-making 
process, would lead to a streamlined and coherent allocation of EU resources in favour of 
enhanced results and impact. The EU's grant aid footprint would be reduced and aid resources 
concentrated on a limited number of significant country programmes, but the EU's overall 
global footprint would be maintained via non-aid development relationships with those 
countries where the grant aid programme ceases. The overall impact on the EU's reputation as 
a global development player is likely to be enhanced by this more focused and modern 
approach. 
 
Ensuring close coordination and effective division of labour between the Commission and 
Member States is a sine qua non condition for such this option. By leading by example, the 
Commission can increase the visibility and legitimacy of its own aid and encourage EU 
Member States to do likewise. This would strengthen the Commission's role of convener and 
coordinator.  
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As with Options 2 and 3, Option 4 would have implications for the distribution of human 
resources. This impact is likely to be greater than in the case of the partial options due to the 
double-focusing process. Those delegations where the aid programme is significantly reduced 
or stopped would need skills in managing exit strategies and then in forging new non-aid 
relationships with the partner government (e.g. based on trilateral cooperation or loans); this 
will require a significantly different skill set from the implementation of grant aid 
programmes. Those delegations where the aid programme is stepped up, but where the 
sectoral focus is tightened, may need new sectoral skills. All delegations will need enhanced 
skills in coordination.  
 
 
STREGTHS WEAKESSES 
Increased critical mass in certain countries, 
ability to do larger-scale projects, value for 
money 
In the short to medium term, higher 
transaction costs for Member States and for 
COM (transfer and training of staff) 
In the long-run, lower transaction costs for 
the Commission and partner countries (no 
need to negotiate in how many sectors we 
intervene) 
May create more gaps (orphans – countries 
and sectors) when offer doesn't match the 
demand of countries 
Strengthened role for COM in initiating and 
coordinating DoL 
Loss of COM expertise and competence in 
certain sectors 
Opportunity for more advanced and 
meaningful relationships with wealthier 
developing countries, with benefits for the 
EU (global public goods) as well as for the 
partner country 
Reputational risk, reduced credibility for the 
COM to represent the EU in all sectors 
globally 
Allows COM to achieve a more balanced and 
strategic role as donor (less open to criticism) 
Possible loss of EU influence in certain 
regions and countries 
Reinforces the role of the COM as 
coordinator for DoL  
Uncertainty over addressing sub-regional & 
cross-regional challenges 
 Increased visibility and reputation in certain 
areas 
More likely to meet the commitments for 
SSA and LDCs 
 Easier to monitor impact/ results 
Higher risk of real or perceived politicisation 
of aid (uncertainty of criteria for 
differentiation) 
 
 
Winners/losers 
 
Winners: Mostly LDCs/LICs who may see aid allocation increasing; Member States who can 
focus on other sectors and countries (complementarity); NGOs operating in focal sectors and 
countries 
 
Losers: Developing countries that lose a significant part (most/all) of aid; some poor people in 
wealthier MICs; NGOs who received money until now but whose sectors and/or regions of 
intervention no longer match Commission priorities 
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8. Comparison of options  
 
Objective/ 
Criteria 
Option 1 – 
Status Quo 
Option 2 – 
Sectoral 
focus 
Option 3 – 
Geographical 
focus 
Option 4 – 
Sectoral and 
geographical 
focus 
Maximise the 
impact of EU 
development 
aid on 
poverty 
reduction 
 
(-) 
 
(+) 
 
(+) 
 
(+) 
 
Sharpen 
development 
policy focus 
for better 
results 
 
(-) 
Scarce 
resources 
spread too 
thinly, 
resulting in 
negligible 
impact 
 
(+) 
Increased 
critical mass 
through 
concentration 
of resources on 
limited number 
of sectors 
(leading to 
increased 
impact) 
 
(+) 
Increased 
critical mass in 
certain 
countries 
 
 
(+) 
Increased 
critical mass 
through 
concentration 
of resources 
spread on 
limited number 
of sectors and 
limited number 
of countries 
Direct 
Commission 
managed aid 
where it is 
most needed 
and where it 
has the 
greatest 
impact on 
poverty 
reduction  
 
(-) 
Scarce 
resources 
spread too 
thinly, 
resulting in 
negligible 
impact 
 
 
(-) 
Aid still goes 
to countries 
that don't need 
it  
 
(+) 
Targeted aid to 
those countries 
that need it the 
most  
 
 
(+)  
Strengthened 
focus on main 
priority 
countries and 
sectors. 
Use 
Commission's 
comparative 
advantage to 
focus 
Commission 
managed 
development 
aid 
 
(-) 
Scarce 
resources 
spread too 
thinly, 
resulting in 
negligible 
impact 
 
(+) 
Specialised 
expertise and 
staff, leading to 
more 
efficiency 
 
 
(-) 
Commission 
resources still 
dispersed in 
many sectors 
 
 
(+) 
Strengthened 
focus on 
sectors where 
Commission 
has expertise 
(cf. results of 
consultation) 
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Objective/ 
Criteria 
Option 1 – 
Status Quo 
Option 2 – 
Sectoral 
focus 
Option 3 – 
Geographical 
focus 
Option 4 – 
Sectoral and 
geographical 
focus 
Increase the 
capacity of 
Commission 
managed aid 
to leverage 
financial 
resources for 
development 
 
(-) 
Lost 
opportunities 
in forging 
partnerships 
with other 
actors 
(including 
private sector, 
emerging 
economies) 
 
 
(+) 
Increased 
critical mass in 
certain 
countries 
 
 
(-) 
Possible loss of 
EU influence 
in certain 
regions and 
countries 
 
(+) 
Commission 
acting as a 
convener to 
catalyse 
significant 
resources for 
development 
Increase the 
capacity of 
Commission 
managed aid 
to leverage 
policy change 
 
(-) 
Moral hazard: 
less incentive 
for reform 
 
(+) 
Increased 
visibility and 
reputation in 
certain key 
issues 
 
(+) 
Increased 
critical mass in 
certain 
countries 
 
(+) 
Increased 
critical mass in 
certain 
countries 
Improve EU 
development 
policy 
coordination 
and Division 
of Labour 
 
(-) 
Aid 
fragmentation 
and donor 
coordination 
aren't tackled 
 
 
(+) 
Strengthened 
role for 
Commission in 
initiating and 
coordinating 
DoL  
 
(+) 
Strengthened 
role for 
Commission in 
initiating and 
coordinating 
DoL  
 
(+) 
Strengthened 
role for 
Commission in 
initiating and 
coordinating 
DoL  
Strengthen 
legitimacy, 
credibility, 
visibility, 
relevance and 
public support 
for 
development 
aid 
 
(-) 
In the long run, 
EU aid loses 
relevance and 
legitimacy 
because of lack 
of impact 
 
(+) 
Increased 
visibility and 
reputation in 
certain key 
issues 
 
(+) 
Strengthened 
legitimacy in 
policy debates 
on countries 
where 
Commission is 
present 
(intellectual 
leadership) 
 
(+) 
Increased 
visibility and 
reputation in 
certain sectors 
and countries 
 
The above analysis and this comparison table indicate that the preferred option is Option 4.  
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8.1. Risks 
 
Human resources: Implementation of any of the Options 2, 3 or 4 will require significant 
shifts in the pattern of human resources (personnel and skills) in DEVCO headquarters and 
delegations. If these changes are not implemented smoothly, or take too long, then there will 
be a mismatch between country programmes and staffing to implement them – i.e. the wrong 
people, with the wrong skills, will be in the wrong places.  
 
Reputation: The reputational risks of not making a change outweigh the risks of making a 
change. For the Commission to continue to be seen as a cutting-edge development actor, and 
for the EU to maintain its reputation not just for the quantity, but also the quality of its aid, 
change is required to make the EU development effort fit for the current decade and beyond. 
Failure to secure value for money for the European taxpayer, failure to be visible to the public 
in developing countries and internationally, and failure to monitor results and continually 
learn lessons and improve the EU's programming and impact would all lead to reputational 
losses. 
 
Political risks: The proposed agenda for change will require political agreement by the 
Member States in Council (Council Conclusions are foreseen for early 2012). Policy changes 
will be reflected in the new financial and legal instruments for the post-2013 Multi-Annual 
Financial Perspective; these instruments will require the agreement of the Council, EEAS, 
Parliament and Commission. Political priorities, particularly the geographic interests of 
certain Member States and Parliamentarians, may limit the scope to implement objective 
decisions vis-à-vis sectoral specialisation and geographic differentiation.  
 
Implementation risks:  The changes proposed by Options 2, 3 and 4 require effective EU 
and wider donor coordination, strong information bases and networks (including on who is 
doing what and where, and who plans to change their aid portfolios and when), and successful 
implementation of division of labour, which has to date been weak. Real political will on the 
part of Member States will be needed to overcome current limitations in this area; the 
Commission must take forward, and be allowed to take forward, its enhanced coordinating 
role as mandated in the Lisbon Treaty. 
 
Financial risks: The timing of these proposals is sensitive, given the negotiations on the MFF 
taking place in 2011.  
 
Impacts at partner country level: While partner country ownership will be central to the 
EU's decisions on re-profiling its portfolio, there remains a risk of mismatch, at least in 
certain countries, between the EU's sectoral offer and the demand/needs of partner countries. 
EU joint programming will go a long way towards mitigating against this risk, but certain 
sectors may no longer be supported by the EU (sector orphans).  
 
one of these risks are "killer" risks, but the design of the proposed agenda for change (as 
set out in the Communication and subsequently in the legal instruments and regulations for 
the post-2013 MFF), as well as the implementation of an internal change programme (human 
resources) will be critical.  
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Additionally, further studies may be useful to help identify appropriate mitigation 
strategies:  
 
Firstly, as regards sector focus, analysis of the risks of certain sectors no longer being directly 
supported (sector orphans) by Commission-managed aid. This analysis should notably take 
into consideration the extent to which such an approach could potentially affect the 
comprehensiveness of EU development policy (multidimensional poverty) and the reputation 
of the EU. 
Secondly, as regards differentiation, analysis of the risks of some poor population groups in 
several countries (such as MICs) no longer being targeted by Commission-managed aid. This 
analysis should take into consideration the extent to which such an approach could potentially 
affect EU global presence and lead to a loss of influence in certain countries and regions. 
 
Thirdly, an analysis from a legal, economic and fiduciary risk point of view, of the types of 
cooperation and partnership frameworks that the EU should establish with other key 
stakeholders such as emerging economies and donors, large international private foundations 
and the business sector. 
 
8.2. Monitoring and evaluation 
 
The Commission already has regular monitoring and evaluation systems in place, covering the 
breadth of its aid programme. The information gathered enables the regular assessment of 
progress towards objectives and results to be achieved, aiming to improve the quality, 
effectiveness and consistency of implementation.  National monitoring systems as well as 
joint monitoring systems with partner countries, Member States, international organisations or 
other bodies are particularly considered.  
 
The Commission currently evaluates country and thematic strategies, individual programmes 
and projects. Larger evaluation exercises assess the complementarity and synergy between the 
different legislative instruments, including non-spending activities. Complex evaluations may 
also cover overarching political objectives as laid down in relevant political processes as well 
as address cross-cutting and transversal issues relevant to all or several legislative 
instruments. 
 
As far as possible, the Commission associates all relevant stakeholders in the evaluation phase 
of the EU assistance, including joint evaluations.  
 
The Communication will be implemented via the legal instruments for the post-2013 MFF 
(e.g. future equivalents of the DCI, EDF10, ENPI, etc). These instruments would be expected 
to include a mid-point or similar review or evaluation.  
 
 
9. Conclusion 
 
The Impact Assessment concludes that a sharpened focus, both sectoral and geographical, is 
the best option in view of increasing the impact of Commission-managed aid.  
 
Increased specialisation and better division of labour should lead to greater efficiency, 
economies of scale and lower transaction costs whose benefits could be used to further 
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reinforce the financial resources available and to enhance the EU's negotiating/bargaining 
power. In doing so, the Commission will remain a key global actor on development issues, 
while concentrating its aid on those sectors and countries where impact is the highest, 
assuring EU visibility and reputation. 
 
. 
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Annex 1: List of acronyms and glossary 
 
 
Acronyms: 
 
BRICS: Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa 
CODEV: Working Party on Development Cooperation 
CSP: Country Strategy Paper  
DAC: Development Assistance Committee 
DCI: Development Cooperation Instrument 
DEVE: Committee on Development (European Parliament) 
DoL: Division of Labour 
EDF: European Development Fund 
EEAS: European External Action Service 
EIDHR: European Instrument for Human Rights and Democracy 
EMEs: Emerging Economies 
ENPI: European Neighbouring and Partnership Instrument 
FDI: Foreign Direct Investment 
FTI: Fast Track Initiative  
GDP: Gross Domestic Product 
GNI: Gross National Income  
IAB: Impact Assessment Board 
IFIs: International Financial Institutions 
IFS: Instrument for Stability 
LDCs: Least Developed Countries 
LICs: Low Income Countries 
MDGs: Millennium Development Goals  
MFF: Multi-Annual Financial Framework 
ODA: Official Development Assistance 
OOF: Other Official Flows 
PCD: Policy Coherence for Development  
SSA: Sub-Saharan African countries 
TNCs: Transnational Corporations 
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Glossary: 
 
Accra Agenda for Action: (2008) Designed to strengthen and deepen implementation of the 
Paris Declaration, it takes stock of progress and sets the agenda for accelerated advancement 
towards the Paris targets. It proposes three main areas for improvement, i.e. ownership, 
inclusive partnerships and delivering results
78
. 
 
Aid Fragmentation: the report considers mainly fragmentation of aid across countries. It is 
different from fragmentation of aid within countries, usually measured by donor spread across 
sectors at country level and small project size. An associate concept is that of proliferation, 
i.e. number of Donors providing ODA to a given beneficiary country in specific sectors. 
Fragmentation is also associated with the number of aid activities (i.e. number of projects'). 
 
Code of Conduct on Complementarity and the Division of Labour in Development 
Policy: (2007) With a view to improving the performance of European Union (EU) 
cooperation policy, the Commission is proposing a voluntary Code of Conduct for better DoL 
among the EU donors in developing countries. The Code is based on eleven principles 
designed to reduce the administrative formalities, to use the funds where they are most 
needed, to pool aid and to share the work to deliver more, better and faster aid79. 
 
OECD DAC members: Australia, Austria, Belgium Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece,  Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States, European 
Commission. 
 
Development effectiveness: The term development effectiveness is meant to describe the 
level of achievement of overall development goals which are affected by a host of different 
factors. By adding the notion of effectiveness to the term development, the idea is to assess 
cooperation against official, long term and quantifiable development goals (e.g. the MDGs or 
national goals).  
 
DCI (Development Cooperation Instrument): (2007) instrument which replaces a wide 
range of geographic and thematic ones. Under this instrument, the EU finances measures 
aimed at supporting geographic and thematic cooperation with developing countries (as 
included in the list of aid recipients complied by the Development Assistance Committee of 
the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD/DAC). It covers three 
components: 1)geographic programmes supporting cooperation with 47 developing countries 
in Latin America, Asia and Central Asia, the Gulf region (Iran, Iraq and Yemen) and South 
Africa; 2)thematic programmes benefiting all developing countries and supporting actions in 
the fields of investing in people, environment and sustainable management of natural 
resources including energy; non-state actors and local authorities in development, food 
security, migration and asylum; 3) programme of accompanying measures for the 18 African, 
Caribbean and Pacific(ACP) Sugar Protocol countries, in order to help them adjust following 
the reform of the EU sugar regime. The budget allocated under the DCI for the period 2007-
2013 is €16.9 billion80. 
 
                                                 
78 http://www.oecd.org/document/18/0,3343,en_2649_3236398_35401554_1_1_1_1,00.html#Paris 
79 http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/development/general_development_framework/r13003_en.htm 
80 http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/finance/dci_en.htm 
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EIDHR (European Instrument for Human Rights and Democracy): (2007) instrument 
used to provide support for the promotion of democracy and human rights in non-EU 
countries. For the period 2007-2013 the EIDHR has a budget of €1.104 billion81 
 
EDF (European Development Fund): (1959) it is the main instrument for providing 
Community development aid in the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries and the 
overseas countries and territories (OCTs). The 10th EDF (2008-2013) has a budget of €22 682 
million82.  
 
EPI (European eighbourhood and Partnership Instrument): is the main source of 
funding for the 17 partner countries (10 Mediterranean and 6 Eastern European countries, plus 
Russia), replacing the co-operation programmes TACIS (for the Eastern European countries) 
and MEDA (for the Mediterranean countries). The ENPI has a financial envelope of €11.2 
billion for the period 2007-201383. 
 
EU Development Policy: refers to the total of collective and individual development policies 
of EU and its Member States, with the same scope as the current European Consensus on 
Development.  
 
Fast Track Initiative on Division of Labour: (2008) the purpose of the FTI DoL is to help 
implement the EU Code of Conduct on Division of Labour adopted by the Council of 
Ministers in May 2007. It intends to support a selected group of partner countries in the 
process of implementing in-country DoL84. 
 
Country in situation of Fragility: State fragility is here defined as a lack of capacity to 
perform basic state functions, where “capacity” encompasses (a) organisational, institutional 
and financial capacity to carry out basic functions of governing a population and territory, and 
(b) the state’s ability to develop mutually constructive and reinforcing relations with society 
(OECD 2010). 
 
Green paper "EU development policy in support of inclusive growth and sustainable 
development - Increasing the impact of EU development policy": The objective of this Green 
Paper was to launch a debate on how the EU can improve the impact of its development 
policy, and how it can best support poorest countries' efforts in promoting inclusive and 
sustainable growth, including by leveraging new opportunities to speed up progress towards 
the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and to reduce poverty85. 
 
Impact: the end-result of an analytical evidence-based process by which the effect of aid 
activities is quantified, where possible. Impact may refer to programme targeting: how to 
reach the poorest and most vulnerable, to programme scaling. 
 
Inclusive and sustainable Growth: the meaning is generally referred to the labour intensity 
of growth, its geographical or distributional impact or its sectoral pattern. It supports the case 
that growth associated with progressive distributional changes will have greater impact in 
                                                 
81 http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/finance/eidhr_en.htm 
82 http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/finance/edf_en.htm 
83 http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/finance/enpi_en.htm 
84 http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/36/35/46836584.pdf 
85 http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/public-consultations/5241_en.htm 
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reducing poverty86. The concept of sustainability implies the idea that growth needed to 
satisfy present needs should not compromise the ability of future generations to meet their 
own needs. 
 
IFS: (2007) The Instrument for Stability (IfS) is a strategic tool designed to address a number 
of global security and development challenges in complement to geographic instruments87.  
 
Least Developed Countries: they represent the poorest countries as identified periodically by 
the UN on the basis of established criteria (low income, weak human assets, economic 
vulnerability). The current list of LDCs includes 48 countries; 33 in Africa, 14 in Asia and the 
Pacific and one in Latin America88.  
 
MDGs: Adopted by world leaders in the year 2000 and set to be achieved by 2015, the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) provide concrete, numerical benchmarks for 
tackling extreme poverty in its many dimensions. They also provide a framework for the 
entire international community to work together towards a common end – making sure that 
human development reaches everyone, everywhere89.  
 
ODA: Flows of official financing administered with the promotion of the economic 
development and welfare of developing countries as the main objective, and which are 
concessional in character with a grant element of at least 25 percent (using a fixed 10 percent 
rate of discount)90. 
 
Paris Declaration: (2005) it lays out a practical, action-oriented roadmap to improve the 
quality of aid and its impact on development. It puts in place a series of specific 
implementation measures and establishes a monitoring system to assess progress and ensure 
that donors and recipients hold each other accountable for their commitments. The Paris 
Declaration outlines five fundamental principles for making aid more effective which are:  
1) Ownership: Partner countries exercise effective leadership over their development 
policies and strategies and co-ordinate development actions  
2) Alignment: Donors base their overall support on partner countries' national 
development strategies, institutions and procedures  
3) Harmonisation: Donors' actions are more harmonized, transparent and collectively 
effective  
4) Managing for Results: Managing resources and improving decision-making for 
results  
5) Mutual Accountability: Donors and partners are accountable for development 
results91. 
 
Policy Coherence for Development: The EU seeks to build synergies between policies other 
than development cooperation that have a strong impact on developing countries, for the 
benefit of overseas development. In 2005, the EU agreed to apply the Policy Coherence for 
Development approach in 12 policy areas (trade, environment and climate change, security, 
                                                 
86 Many factors affect the distribution of income or consumption, and there is no clear link between economic 
growth and changes in income distribution.  World Bank Social Indicators Report 2010.  
87 http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/finance/ifs_en.htm 
88 http://www.unohrlls.org/en/ldc/25/ 
89 http://www.undp.org/mdg/basics.shtml 
90 www.oecd.org 
91 http://www.oecd.org/document/18/0,3343,en_2649_3236398_35401554_1_1_1_1,00.html 
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agriculture, bilateral fisheries agreements, social policies, migration, research/innovation, 
information technologies, transport and energy) that could accelerate progress towards 
the Millennium development goals for development92. 
 
                                                 
92 http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/what/development-policies/policy-coherence/index_en.htm 
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Annex 2: Summary of the public consultation  
 
Green Paper on "EU development policy in support of inclusive growth and sustainable 
development – Increasing the impact of EU development policy"
93 
 
There was a rich and healthy participation in the public consultation on the Green Paper “EU 
Development Policy in support of inclusive growth and sustainable development – Increasing 
the impact of EU development policy.” The public consultation was launched after the 
publication of the Green paper on the Europa website and ran for the period 15 November 
2010 – 17 January 2011. In addition to the questionnaire contained in the Green Paper itself, 
several events were organised in parallel to present and discuss the Green Paper with different 
categories of stakeholders.  
 
240 written responses were received. The total documentation of responses amounted to more 
than 2,000 pages. All contributions have been made publicly available on the Commission 
EuropeAid website94. The following table lists the number of responses by each category of 
respondent. 
 
CATEGORIES # responses 
 MEMBER STATES  
  CE+TRAL GOVER+ME+TS/MI+ISTRIES 22 
  +ATIO+AL AGE+CIES 3 
 LOCAL AD REGIOAL AUTHORITIES 17 
 PARLIAMETS 6 
 O-EU DOORS 3 
 O-STATE ACTORS  
   +GOs 97 
   TRADE U+IO+S / PROFESSIO+AL BODIES 7 
   PRIVATE SECTOR / BUSI+ESS 24 
   THI+K TA+KS/ ACADEMIC I+STITUTIO+S 16 
 ITERATIOAL/REGIOAL ORGAISATIOS 8 
 PARTER COUTRIES  
   GOVER+ME+TS/MI+ISTRIES 8 
   LOCAL/REGIO+AL GOVER+ME+T 3 
IDIVIDUALS  
   EU 14 
   +O+-EU 5 
OTHER/USPECIFIED 7 
Total 240 
 
                                                 
93 The full report is accessible at: http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/public-consultations/5241_en.htm  
94 http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/how/public-consultations/5241_en.htm  
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The Green Paper contained 26 open questions relating to a set of four main concerns: 
• How to ensure high EU impact development policy; 
• How to facilitate more, and more inclusive, growth in developing countries; 
• How to promote sustainable development as a driver for progress; and 
• How to achieve durable results in the area of agriculture and food security 
 
The following report summarises the main issues raised in the responses. 
 
General comments/cross-cutting issues 
 
The EU is the world’s largest provider of Official Development Assistance (ODA), totalling 
almost € 54 billion in 2010. It is also the world’s largest economic bloc with 501 million 
inhabitants and a total GDP of over € 12 trillion in 2009; its annual imports from third 
countries exceed € 1.3 trillion (Euro zone only).  
 
Most respondents welcomed the Green Paper as a very timely initiation of a broader 
reflection and debate on EU development policy, especially against the backdrop of recent 
geopolitical and institutional as reflected, inter alia, in the setting up of the G20 and the 
creation of the new European External Action Service. The consultation also tied in with the 
discussions that precede the next EU financial framework 2014-2020.  
 
Respondents recognised that the current financial and economic crisis creates additional need 
to ensure that ODA funds, since they derive from donor governments’ budgets, are used with 
the aim of maximizing the impact on poverty. This will be necessary to secure continued 
support from taxpayers for future increases in development aid.  
 
Most respondents therefore endorsed the increased emphasis on inclusive economic 
development, growth and employment creation for which ODA plays a catalytic part, since 
it mobilises additional domestic and international funding needed to achieve the MDGs and 
the ultimate goal of eliminating poverty. This was, however, contested by some respondents, 
especially from the NGO community, who pointed out that there is little evidence to suggest 
that economic growth without active redistributive policies and social protection systems 
has had an impact on poverty in the past. 
 
A number of respondents stated that the Green Paper provided insufficient analysis and 
evaluation of the impact of current policies. Many of the terms used in the Green Paper 
needed definition and further clarification, including “high impact”, “added value” and 
“inclusive growth”, none of which appear in current EU development policy legislation.  
 
Several respondents therefore called for current policies to remain in place as outlined in 
the Lisbon Treaty and the European Consensus on Development. These define the 
eradication of poverty as the overarching objective for the use of EU ODA. Policy coherence 
should be assessed against this goal alone, it was argued. In addition, some contributions 
recalled that, while the Treaty calls for the EU and Member States development policy to 
complement and reinforce each other, development is not, unlike trade and climate change, an 
EU responsibility. 
 
Furthermore, it was argued that the EU is a value-based organisation and that its 
development policies should be based on promotion of democracy, fundamental human rights 
and freedoms, including those of women, children, disabled people and minorities. 
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Most of the Member States underscored in their contributions that they saw the Green Paper, 
together with the consultations on the funding of EU external action after 2013 and on EU 
budget support, as the starting points of a longer process of elaborating and agreeing a new 
EU development policy. Development research institutions call for the EU to take the 
intellectual leadership in this process. 
 
1. High Impact development policy 
 
Many respondents underlined that ODA constitutes only a fraction of funding for 
development, and needs to be seen as a complement to domestically mobilised resources, 
foreign investments, trade and remittances. At the same time, in low-income and/or fragile 
countries ODA can provide up to half of development resources available. These respondents 
therefore called for traditional ODA development programmes to be primarily reserved 
for the Least Developed Countries (LDCs). However, they also called for an overhaul and 
redefinition of the classification of countries that are eligible to receive ODA, as it is defined 
by the OECD-DAC. 
 
Consistent with the call for reserving ODA for the LDCs was the demand for greater 
coherence in EU development policy especially with regards to MICs. The establishment of 
the EEAS provides an opportunity for a more holistic approach to external action, 
including all aspects of EU action: trade, commerce, agriculture, fisheries, intellectual 
property, security, climate change etc.  
 
Many answers endorsed the notion of more focused aid and a consolidation of the currently 
more than 45,000 projects funded by EU donors, combined with further cross-country and in-
country division of labour among EU donors. Aid should be consolidated into multi-donor, 
sector/thematic sector wide approaches (SWAp) with long-term, predictable and reliable 
funding commitments based on strengthened PEFA and other assessment systems. Apart 
from education and health, energy infrastructure, agriculture/food security and aid for trade 
are identified as focus areas. 
 
While joint EU country programming of assistance was endorsed in principle, it should be 
introduced gradually starting with countries where it would yield demonstrable added value. 
Conflict analysis should be a mandatory part of the joint assessments that precede country 
programming exercises. 
 
A number of contributions underlined that development cooperation must be a reciprocal 
partnership. In exchange for long-term EU commitments, partner countries need to commit 
to allocating a sufficient part of their budgets to priority areas such as social sector reform, 
health and education.  
 
Many respondents called for increased direct involvement by elected parliamentary 
assemblies at national, regional and local levels in both EU and partner countries as part of a 
broadened partnership between democratic institutions. There were equally-strong calls for 
broader involvement of civil society organisations – North and South – including private 
sector organisations, in the programming, monitoring and evaluation of assistance. 
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2. Inclusive and sustainable growth 
 
While most respondents recognised economic growth as a necessary condition for 
development, many also pointed out that growth alone is not sufficient. International 
agreements on transparency, decent work and environmental standards, as well as effective, 
transparent monitoring of actual behaviour combined with effective sanctions should form 
part of EU development policy, as outlined for example in the Initiative on Extractive 
Industries. 
 
However, there was almost universal support for active promotion of local SMEs, 
especially in the agricultural sector, by supporting necessary infrastructure in transport, 
energy and communications (ICT). Even more important, is the strengthening of the legal and 
financial frameworks that are necessary to entice the informal sector into the official economy 
and to broaden the development resource base. 
 
A case was made for reinvigorating the creation of cooperative enterprises, especially 
producer-cooperatives in the agricultural and fisheries sectors, as a stakeholder alternative to 
the shareholder company model currently predominant in the West. It was pointed out that the 
democratic structure of cooperatives brings with it in-built training in participatory democracy 
and governance. 
 
Many respondents called for increased ODA support for direct funding of social 
protection systems, especially targeted to the poor. 
 
3. Sustainable development 
 
Some respondents suggested that the term “green development” should replace “sustainable 
development” because it has greater universal recognition. 
 
Climate change adaptation was seen as a priority and the work of OECD/DAC in 
developing guidelines and accounting rules for assistance to climate change was considered of 
particular relevance to promote coherence and to leverage financing. 
 
It was suggested that the EU should conform to the atural Resource Charter when 
providing development assistance. Equally, the EU should support the goal of the CBD 
Nagoya Strategic Plan towards stopping global deforestation by 2020. 
 
There were diverging views on how to strike the right balance between support for mitigation 
and adaptation measures in the area of climate change.  Programmes need to be designed 
for different circumstances in different countries. However, countries’ exposure to natural 
hazards is generally not underlined to the extent it should be in Country Strategy Papers, with 
disaster risk reduction – or prevention - measures rarely included in agreed programmes. 
 
Support to sustainable energy cannot be seen apart from the EU strategy on climate change 
and development. There are Council Conclusions (May 2009) and an Energy Facility, which 
should be implemented.  
 
It was pointed out that reliable, sustainable, and renewable sources of energy are among the 
necessary conditions for enhancing economic activities and reduction of poverty. The priority 
of the EU’s efforts should therefore be support for accessible sources of energy at the local 
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level, energy self-sufficiency, with emphasis on the diversification of energy sources, clean 
technologies, emission reduction, know-how exchanges in the sphere of energy efficiency, 
and the sustainable use of water and soil, including minerals. 
 
Many respondents, especially NGOs, advocated that all actions relating to Climate Change 
measures should be funded separately from ODA and not counted under ODA. 
 
4. Agriculture and Food Security 
 
Most respondents strongly endorsed incorporating sustainable agriculture and food 
security in the priority areas for EU development policy. Strategic areas should encompass 
support for smallholders, including land tenure rights and provision of knowledge, supplies 
and equipment.  
 
It was pointed out that the EU possesses extensive expertise relating to sustainable agriculture 
under changing conditions, which it should use to support initiatives in poor countries with 
the aim of optimising use of agricultural production means, integrated plant protection, 
improved land and water resource management and the introduction of resistant species. 
 
EU countries have broad experience when it comes to carrying out systemic and 
economic transformations, also in the agricultural sectors. In developing countries, such 
experience should be used to promote ownership relations and the right to use land for rural 
populations. These are pre-requisites for greater efficiency. 
 
Support for agro-ecological solutions, applied research and capacity building for extension 
services were emphasised as priority areas. Support to smallholder farmers was widely 
endorsed as well as the special targeting of women farmers.  
 
5. Missing areas 
 
Many respondents pointed out that the Green Paper did not pay sufficient attention to 
fundamental issues, such as democracy and human rights, the important role of women 
in development, or to the rights of children, minorities, indigenous peoples or the 
disabled. Similarly, it was felt that issues related to HIV/AIDS, pervasive corruption and lack 
of transparency were inadequately covered in the Paper. 
 
  53 
Annex 3: EU country aid allocations (2007-2013) 
 
 
  Country Pop GNI 
Total 
ODA ODA ODA HDI EU AID 
    mill capita million $ per Capita  %GNI Ranking 
Country 
envelope  
                mill EURO  
ACP               
1 Angola 18,5 $3.490 239 $12,92  0,4 LHD 173,0 € 
2 Antigua e Barbuda 0,1 $12.070 6 $60,00  0,6 n.a. 3,4 € 
3 Bahamas 0,3 $21.390 n.a.     HHD 4,7 € 
4 Barbados 0,3 $9.140 12 $40,00    HHD 9,8 € 
5 Belize 0,3 $3.740 28 $93,33  2,0 HHD 9,8 € 
6 Bénin 8,9 $750 683 $76,74  10,3 LHD 267,0 € 
7 Botswana 1,9 $6.240 290 $152,63  2,5 MHD 56,0 € 
8 Burkina Faso 15,8 $510 1084 $68,61  13,5 LHD 423,0 € 
9 Burundi 8,3 $150 549 $66,14  41,2 LHD 150,5 € 
10 Cameroun 19,5 $1.170 649 $33,28  3,0 LHD 190,8 € 
11 Cap Vert 0,5 $3.010 196 $392,00  13,1 MHD 38,4 € 
12 République Centrafricaine 4,4 $450 237 $53,86  11,9 LHD 109,0 € 
13 Tchad 11,2 $610 561 $50,09  9,2 LHD 299,0 € 
14 Comores 0,7 $870 51 $72,86  9,2 LHD 45,0 € 
15 RDC 66 $160 2354 $35,67  23,5 LHD 514,0 € 
16 Congo 3,7 $1.830 283 $76,49  4,7 MHD 85,0 € 
17 Cook (islands) n.a. n.a. n.a.   8,0 n.a. 3,0 € 
18 Cote d Ivoire 21,1 $1.060 2366 $112,13  10,7 LHD 218,0 € 
19 Cuba 11,2 n.a 116 $10,36  n.a n.a  
20 Djibouti 0,9 $1.280 162 $180,00  14,5 LHD 40,5 € 
21 Dominica 0,1 $4.870 36 $360,00  10,1 n.a. 5,7 € 
22 République Dominicaine 10,1 $4.510 120 $11,88  0,3 MHD 179,0 € 
23 East Timor 1,1 n.a. 217 $197,27  n.a. MHD 63,0 € 
24 Guinée Equatoriale 0,7 $12.420 32 $45,71  0,5 MHD 12,5 € 
25 Eritrea 5,1 n.a. 145 $28,43  n.a. n.a. 122,4 € 
26 Ethiopia 82,8 $330 3825 $46,20  13,4 LHD 644,0 € 
27 Fiji 0,8 $3.950 71 $88,75  2,3 MHD ?? 
28 Gabon 1,5 $7.370 78 $52,00  0,8 MHD 40,8 € 
29 Gambia 1,7 $440 128 $75,29  18,5 LHD 63,2 € 
30 Ghana 23,8 $700 1586 $66,64  10,4 LHD 282,0 € 
31 Grenada 0,1 $5.550 48 $480,00  8,3 n.a. 6,0 € 
32 Guinea 10,1 n.a. 215 $21,29  n.a. LHD 189,6 € 
33 Guinea-Bissau 1,6 n.a. 146 $91,25  n.a. LHD 77,0 € 
34 Guyana 0,8 n.a. 173 $216,25  n.a. MHD 40,8 € 
35 Haiti 10 n.a. 1121 $112,10  n.a. LHD 291,0 € 
36 Jamaica 2,7 $4.490 150 $55,56  1,1 HHD 110,0 € 
37 Kenya 39,8 $770 1788 $44,92  5,9 LHD 306,0 € 
38 Kiribati 0,1 $1.890 27 $270,00  115,4 n.a. 10,6 € 
39 Lesotho 2,1 $1.030 123 $58,57  5,8 LHD 108,8 € 
40 Liberia 4 $160 505 $126,25  78,3 LHD 119,6 € 
41 Madagascar 19,6 n.a. 445 $22,70  n.a. LHD 462,0 € 
42 Malawi 15,3 $280 778 $50,85  17,6 LHD 349,0 € 
43 Mali 13 $680 988 $76,00  11,0 LHD 426,5 € 
44 Marshall Island 0,1 $3.060 59 $590,00  32,1 n.a. 4,5 € 
45 Mauritania 3,3 $960 287 $86,97  9,4 LHD 124,8 € 
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  Country Pop GNI 
Total 
ODA ODA ODA HDI EU AID 
    mill capita million $ per Capita  %GNI Ranking 
Country 
envelope  
                mill EURO  
46 Mauritius 1,3 $7.240 156 $120,00  1,8 HID 39,6 € 
47 Micronesia 0,1 $2.220 121 $1.210,00  44,7 MHD ?? 
48 Mozambique 22,9 $440 2013 $87,90  20,8 LHD 482,0 € 
49 Namibia 2,2 $4.290 326 $148,18  3,5 MHD 82,6 € 
50 Nauru n.a. n.a. 24   n.a. n.a. 2,2 € 
51 Niger 15,3 $340 470 $30,72  8,9 LHD 366,0 € 
52 Nigeria 154,7 $1.140 1680 $10,86  1,1 LHD 677,0 € 
53 Niue n.a. n.a. 9   n.a. n.a. 2,4 € 
54 Palau n.a. $8.940 35   18,3 n.a. 2,4 € 
55 Papua New Guinea 6,7 $1.180 414 $61,79  5,3 LHD 108,0 € 
56 Rwanda 10 $460   $0,00  18,7 LHD 290,0 € 
57 St. Kitts and Nevis n.a. $10.100 6   1,1 n.a. 4,5 € 
58 St. Lucia 0,2 $5.170 41 $205,00  4,7 n.a. 8,1 € 
59 
St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines 0,1 $5.110 31 $310,00  5,5 n.a. 7,8 € 
60 Samoa 0,2 $2.840 77 $385,00  16,1 n.a. 30,0 € 
61 Sao Tome and Principe 0,2 $1.140 31 $155,00  15,7 MHD 17,1 € 
62 Senegal  12,5 $1.030 1022 $81,76  7,9 LHD 288,0 € 
63 Seychelles 0,1 $8.480 23 $230,00  3,5 n.a. 5,9 € 
64 Sierra Leone 5,7 $340 437 $76,67  23,0 LHD 242,0 € 
65 Solomon Island 0,5 $910 206 $412,00  42,8 MHD 13,2 € 
66 Somalia 9,1 n.a. 662 $72,75  n.a. LHD 212,0 € 
67 South Africa 49,3 $5.770 1078 $21,87  0,4 MHD 980,0 € 
68 Sudan 42,3 $1.220 2289 $54,11  4,6 LHD 258,0 € 
69 Suriname 0,5 n.a. 157 $314,00  n.a. MHD 19,8 € 
70 Swaziland 1,2 $2.350 58 $48,33  2,1 MHD 63,0 € 
71 Tanzania 43,7 $500 2936 $67,19  13,6 LHD 555,0 € 
72 Togo 6,6 $440 499 $75,61  17,5 LHD 123,0 € 
73 Tonga 0,1 $3.260 40 $400,00  12,4 HHD 5,9 € 
74 Trinidad and Tobago 1,3 $16.490 7 $5,38  0,0 HHD 25,5 € 
75 Tuvalu n.a. n.a. 18   n.a. n.a. 5,0 € 
76 Uganda 32,7 $460 1786 $54,62  11,6 LHD 439,0 € 
77 Vanuatu 0,2 $2.620 103 $515,00  16,4 n.a 21,6 € 
78 Zambia 12,9 $970 1272 $98,60  11,2 LHD 475,0 € 
79 Zimbabwe 12,5 n.a. 737 $58,96  n.a. LHD 129,6 € 
                 
ENPI               
1 Algeria 34,9 $4.420 319 $9,14  0,2 HHD 392,0 € 
2 Armenia 3,1 $3.100 528 $170,32  5,9 HHD 255,4 € 
3 Azerbaijan 8,8 $4.840 232 $26,36  0,6 HHD 214,5 € 
4 Belarus 9,7 $5.540 98 $10,10  0,2 HHD 84,2 € 
5 Egypt 83 $2.070 925 $11,14  0,5 MHD 1.007,0 € 
6 Georgia 4,3 $2.530 908 $211,16  8,6 HHD 300,7 € 
7 Israel n.. n.a n.a   n.a VHHD 20,0 € 
8 Jordan 6 $3.740 761 $126,83  3,3 HHD 488,0 € 
9 Lebanon 4,2 $7.970 641 $152,62  1,8   337,0 € 
10 Libya 6,4 $12.020 39 $6,09  0,1 HHD 60,0 € 
11 Moldova 3,6 $1.590 245 $68,06  4,2 MHD 482,8 € 
12 Morocco 32 $2.790 912 $28,50  1,0 MHD 1.234,5 € 
13 
Occupied Palestinian 
Territory 4 n.a. 3026 $756,50  n.a. n.a. ??? 
14 Syria 21,1 $2.410 245 $11,61  0,5 MHD 259,0 € 
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15 Tunisia 10,4 $3.720 474 $45,58  1,3 HHD 540,0 € 
16 Ukraine 46 $2.800 668 $14,52  0,6 HHD 964,1 € 
                 
DCI                
1 Argentina G20 40,3 $7.570 128 $3,18  0,0 HHD 65,0 € 
2 Bolivia 9,9 $1.620 726 $73,33  4,4 MHD 249,0 € 
3 Brazil G20 193,7 $8.040 338 $1,74  0,0 HHD 61,0 € 
4 Chile 17 $9.420 80 $4,71  0,1 HHD 41,0 € 
5 Colombia 45,7 $4.930 1060 $23,19  0,5 HHD 160,0 € 
6 Costa Rica 4,6 $6.230 109 $23,70  0,4 HHD 34,0 € 
7 Cuba 11,2 n.a. 116 $10,36  n.a. n.a. 20,0 € 
8 Ecuador 13,6 $3.920 209 $15,37  0,4 HHD 137,0 € 
9 El Salvador 6,2 $3.370 277 $44,68  1,3 MHD 121,0 € 
10 Guatemala 14 $2.620 376 $26,86  1,1 MHD 135,0 € 
11 Honduras 7,5 $1.820 457 $60,93  3,2 MHD 223,0 € 
12 Mexico 107,4 $8.920 185 $1,72  0,0 HHD 55,0 € 
13 Nicaragua 5,7 $1.000 774 $135,79  13,3 MHD 214,0 € 
14 Panama 3,5 $6.710 66 $18,86  0,3 HHD 38,0 € 
15 Paraguay 6,3 $2.270 148 $23,49  1,0 MHD 117,0 € 
16 Peru 29,2 $4.150 444 $15,21  0,4 HHD 132,0 € 
17 Uruguay 3,3 $9.360 51 $15,45  0,1 HHD 31,0 € 
18 Venezuela 28,4 $10.150 67 $2,36  0,0 HHD 40,0 € 
19 Afghanistan 29,8 n.a 6070 $203,69  n.a LHD 1.030,0 € 
20 Bangladesh 162,2 $590 1240 $7,64  1,2 LHD 403,0 € 
21 Bhutan 0,7 $2.020 125 $178,57  9,5 n.a. 14,0 € 
22 Cambodia 14,8 $650 722 $48,78  7,5 MHD 152,0 € 
23 China G20 1331,5 $3.590 1153 $0,87  0,0 MHD 173,0 € 
24 India G20 1155,3 $1.180 2453 $2,12  0,2 MHD 470,0 € 
25 Indonesia G20 230 $2.230 1050 $4,57  0,2 MHD 494,0 € 
26 Korea Dem People 23,9 n.a. 67 $2,80  n.a. VHHD n.a. 
27 Laos 6,3 $880 420 $66,67  7,2 MHD 41,0 € 
28 Malaysia 27,5 $7.230 144 $5,24  0,1 HHD 17,0 € 
29 Maldives 0,3 $3.870 33 $110,00  2,6 MHD 10,0 € 
30 Mongolia 2,7 $1.630 372 $137,78  9,4 MHD 29,0 € 
31 Myanmar/Burma 50 n.a. 357 $7,14  n.a. LHD 65,0 € 
32 Nepal 29,3 $440 855 $29,18  6,7 LHD 120,0 € 
33 Pakistan 169,7 $1.020 2816 $16,59  1,6 MHD 398,0 € 
34 Philippines 92 $1.790 310 $3,37  0,2 MHD 130,0 € 
35 Sri Lanka 20,3 $1.990 704 $34,68  1,7 MHD 112,0 € 
36 Thailand 67,8 $3.760 -77 -$1,14  0,0 MHD 17,0 € 
37 Vietnam 87,3 $1.010 3744 $42,89  4,2 MHD 304,0 € 
38 Kazakhstan 15,9 $6.740 298 $18,74  0,3 HHD 74,0 € 
39 Kyrgyz Republic 5,3 $870 315 $59,43  7,1 MHD 106,0 € 
40 Tajikistan 7 $700 409 $58,43  8,3 MHD 128,0 € 
41 Turkmenistan  5,1 $3.420 40 $7,84  0,2 MHD 53,0 € 
42 Uzbekistan 27,8 $1.100 190 $6,83  0,6 MHD 74,8 € 
43 Iran  72,9 $4.530 93 $1,28  0,0 HHD n.a. 
44 Iraq 31,5 $2.210 2791 $88,60  4,5 n.a. 58,7 € 
45 Oman 2,8 n.a. 212 $75,71  n.a. n.a. ??? 
46 Saudi Arabia G20 n.a. n.a. n.a.   n.a. HHD ??? 
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47 Yemen 23,6 $1.060 500 $21,19  20,0 LHD 130,0 € 
48 South Africa 49,3 $5.770 1078 $21,87  0,4 MHD 980,0 € 
         
         
         
         
CSPs for Libya, Cuba, Iraq cover only the years 2011-2013    
 
